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WHICH TREATIES REIGN SUPREME?  THE 
DORMANT SUPREMACY CLAUSE EFFECT OF 
IMPLEMENTED NON-SELF-EXECUTING 
TREATIES 
Leonie W. Huang* 
 
The Supremacy Clause includes treaties in the list of supreme laws which 
state judges are bound to uphold against conflicting state laws.  However, 
as the U.S. Supreme Court most recently affirmed in Medellin v. Texas, not 
all Article II treaties receive this Supremacy Clause effect immediately 
upon ratification.  Some treaties, known as non-self-executing treaties, are 
domestically unenforceable by United States courts until passage of federal 
legislation implementing the treaty.  Based on this distinction between non-
self-executing and self-executing treaties, courts have disagreed as to 
whether an implemented non-self-executing treaty can preempt state law or 
whether only the implementing legislation can have such Supremacy Clause 
effect. 
This Note argues that the inclusion of the words “all Treaties” in the 
language of the Supremacy Clause is grounded in the decision that the 
federal government would dominate national foreign relations and in the 
necessity of reigning in conflicting state actions in that area.  Due to this 
constitutional framework, once a non-self-executing treaty has been 
properly implemented, in some cases it can and should preempt state law.  
In short, implemented non-self-executing treaties should have Supremacy 
Clause effect where it is necessary to uphold United States foreign policy 
decisions and to stop states from placing the United States in breach of 
international obligations that have already been domestically executed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Two international wrongs may not make a domestically enforceable 
right,1 but an implemented non-self-executing treaty may.  The Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution states: 
 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.2 
 A plain reading of the first part of the Supremacy Clause implies that 
“Treaties” are, by themselves, the “supreme Law of the Land” in the same 
way as the “Constitution” and statutory “Laws of the United States.”3  The 
clause does not say that a treaty needs a “Law[] of the United States” to be 
 
 1. In Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), violations of a United States treaty 
obligation by the State of Texas resulted in an International Court of Justice judgment. Id. at 
497–98; see also infra Part I.C.2.  Texas’s refusal to comply with the judgment caused a 
violation of another international obligation. Cf. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that although the treaties at issue in Medellin represented international 
obligations, the International Court of Justice judgment was not domestically enforceable. 
See id. at 522–23.  
 2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 3. Id. 
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the “supreme Law,” but rather implies equality between “Treaties” and 
“Laws of the United States” as far as supremacy is concerned.4  However, 
for a very long time, courts and commentators have focused on a distinction 
between two different types of treaties:  non-self-executing treaties—which 
require implementation by a “Law[] of the United States” to have 
Supremacy Clause effect—and self-executing treaties—which do not.5   
 The importance of the non-self-executing/self-executing treaty distinction 
to potential litigants is great.  Assuming the treaty provides a private right 
of action, the possibility of judicial enforcement of that right in the absence 
of an implementing statute turns on the non-self-executing/self-executing 
distinction.6  Another corollary of the distinction is that non-self-executing 
treaties do not automatically bind state judges to override state laws 
contrary to the treaty.7  In contrast, self-executing treaties do bind state 
judges (and a fortiori federal judges who decide state law issues) to 
disregard contrary state laws as soon as the treaty enters into force.8 
One example of this corollary in action is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Medellin v. Texas.9  In Medellin, the Court held that certain 
treaties, purporting to make binding an International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
judgment (which strongly suggested that U.S. courts override state 
procedural bars to consider the merits of claims by Mexican nationals under 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations10), were non-self-
executing.11  This holding necessarily meant that the treaties at issue were 
not entitled to Supremacy Clause effect, and state procedural bars were not 
overridden.12 
Consider for a moment, however, a scenario with two facts different from 
Medellin.  First, assume the treaty sources do make ICJ judgments binding.  
Second, assume the treaty sources had all been implemented by legislation.  
In this scenario, the ICJ judgment logically would have been binding, even 
if there were no legislation enacting the judgment itself.13  Thus Texas state 
procedural bars would have to yield to the judgment and consider the 
claim.14  But what if another federal law (an anti-Supremacy Clause statute 
predating the treaties and implementing legislation) provided that no act of 
Congress will be construed to override state criminal procedural bars?  
Does the result change in this case, and if so why? 
 
 4. See id. 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); infra 
Part I.C. 
 9. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 10. Opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 [hereinafter VCCR] (entered into 
force with respect to the United States of America December 24, 1969).  
 11. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 12. See infra note 146. 
 13. See infra notes 146–57 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
2011] WHICH TREATIES REIGN SUPREME? 2215 
While the above scenario is hypothetical, a similar conflict has recently 
arisen in the federal Courts of Appeals.15  The conflict involves a treaty 
that, like those in the Medellin hypothetical, received Supremacy Clause 
effect by the enactment of an implementing statute.16  The real-life conflict 
also involves an anti-Supremacy Clause statute that disables the Supremacy 
Clause’s command of obedience to state judges.  In this case, the anti-
Supremacy Clause statute permits state judges to apply state laws passed for 
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, even if those laws are 
“Contrary” to “an Act of Congress.”17  The anti-Supremacy Clause statute 
plainly cancels out the Supremacy Clause effect of the implementing 
legislation, which is, after all, an act of Congress.  The question is, does it 
also disable the treaty’s domestic effect as law? 
 The federal Courts of Appeals have been confused about how to address 
this issue18 and this Note seeks to clear up some confusion and provide an 
answer to the question of whether an implemented non-self-executing treaty 
can have independent Supremacy Clause effect.  One answer might be that 
only implementing legislation is given Supremacy Clause effect.19  Under 
that approach, the anti-Supremacy Clause statute effectively disables any 
domestic effect of the implemented non-self-executing treaty. 20  Another 
answer—and, as this Note argues, the correct answer—is that it is possible 
for an implemented non-self-executing treaty to have independent 
Supremacy Clause effect.21   
 The true importance of the non-self-executing/self-executing treaty 
distinction is tied to the constitutional issue of separation of powers.22  The 
distinction turns on whether a treaty without implementing legislation can 
provide a rule of decision for the court or whether some political decision 
yet exists that would be inappropriate for judicial determination.23  
Therefore, when analyzing whether an implemented non-self-executing 
treaty may have independent Supremacy Clause effect, the focus should not 
be on whether an implemented treaty was self-executing or not, but on why 
it had that status.  In other words, the focus should return to the more basic 
inquiry of why a court would not be able to use the treaty as a rule of 
decision, if no implementing legislation had been passed, and whether those 
concerns are germane in light of implementation. 
In sum, the answer is that even under Medellin, a treaty that was 
implemented by statute may be afforded Supremacy Clause effect apart 
from its implementing legislation and bind state and federal judges, “any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
 
 15. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 16. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 17. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 18. See, e.g., infra Part II.B–C. 
 19. See infra Part II.B.2–C. 
 20. See infra Part II.B.2–C. 
 21. See infra Part III.C. 
 22. See infra Parts I.C, III.C. 
 23. See infra Parts I.C, III.C. 
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notwithstanding.”24  Whether a particular non-self-executing treaty has 
continuing force of law—independent of its implementing legislation—
depends to a large extent on three factors:  the reason the treaty was non-
self-executing, the intentions of the treaty makers, and the intentions of the 
implementing legislation.25  Together these factors define the scope of the 
treaty’s Supremacy Clause effect by indicating the foreign policy decision 
the treaty represents and whether that decision was meant to—and should—
stand in the face of a conflicting domestic policy decision.26 
Part I of this Note provides background information, including the 
historical record with respect to the special status of treaties; an explanation 
of the presumption of national governmental dominance in foreign affairs; 
and an overview of United States treaty law, including a survey of the 
Supreme Court’s major treaty execution jurisprudence.  Part II presents two 
conflicting views on the Supremacy Clause effect of implemented non-self-
executing Treaties in cases involving an implemented treaty known as the 
New York Convention and an anti-Supremacy Clause statute known as the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Part II first explains the requirements of the New 
York Convention and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, then describes the 
conflicting views of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Second 
Circuits, as presented in the Fifth Circuit’s majority and dissenting opinions 
in Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London,27 and the Second Circuit’s decision in Stephens v. American 
International Insurance Co.28  Part III argues that “all Treaties,” whether 
self-executing or not, are imbued with the potential for Supremacy Clause 
effect and, to the extent that an implemented non-self-executing treaty 
independently represents a foreign policy decision, the treaty itself can and 
ought to independently have preemptive force as a “supreme Law of the 
Land.”  
I.  KEEPING FAITH WITH TREATIES 
The debate about treaty supremacy begins with Article VI, Clause 2 of 
the United States Constitution.  The plain text of this clause communicates 
that all treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land;”29 nonetheless, the 
proper place for treaties in our federal system has been contested since the 
founding.30  This part provides relevant background information on United 
States treaty law, beginning with Part I.A, which explains the early 
American concern with fulfilling United States treaty obligations and the 
 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part III.C. 
 26. See infra Part III.C. 
 27. 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 28. 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See infra note 44 and accompanying text; see also John T. Parry, Congress, the 
Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1214, 
1328–29, 1332–35 (2009) (arguing that Medellin, rather than creating a conclusion for or 
against a self-executing treaty presumption, is instead the “latest doctrinal contribution” to 
an ongoing conversation about constitutional law and politics in treaty implementation). 
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existing presumption of federal government dominance in foreign relations 
power.  Next, Part I.B discusses the various roles of the three branches of 
the federal government in foreign policy decision making through treaties, 
and constitutional limitations on treaty power.  Finally, Part I.C surveys the 
major cases in the Supreme Court’s treaty execution jurisprudence. 
A.  The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution:  Securing 
Federal Preemption and Foreign Relations Dominance 
1.  The Legacy of the Articles of Confederation 
The American Revolution officially ended with the signing of the 1783 
Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.31  The United States had been operating 
under the Articles of Confederation since their ratification in 1781.32  It 
soon became clear, however, that there were serious problems with the 
governmental structure under the Articles of Confederation.33  The effort to 
address these faults resulted in the drafting of the United States Constitution 
in 1787 followed by its ratification in 1789.34 
The major failing of the Articles of Confederation was the inability of the 
national government to enforce foreign policy, including compliance with 
the 1783 Treaty of Peace.35  As stated by Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist No. 22, 
 A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains 
yet to be mentioned—the want of a judiciary power.  Laws are a dead 
letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and 
operation.  The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must 
be considered as part of the law of the land.  Their true import, as far as 
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial 
 
 31. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Peace]. 
 32. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (6th ed. 2009). 
 33. See Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International 
Tribunal:  Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based 
Suits by Foreign States Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1829–30 (2004) 
(discussing early American concerns regarding state refusal to honor United States 
international obligations); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land:  The 
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 616–
19 (2008); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution:  Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and 
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2013–14 (1999). 
 34. See STONE, supra note 32, at 12. 
 35. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 901 (2004) (“Indeed, the express reference to treaties in the 
Supremacy Clause was an immediate result of the international embarrassment arising from 
the states’ failure to adhere to national treaty obligations—particularly those under the 1783 
Treaty of Paris with Great Britain—under the Articles of Confederation.”); Vázquez, supra 
note 33, at 617 (“The Supremacy Clause was the Founders’ solution to one of the principal 
‘vices’ or ‘evils’ of the Articles of Confederation.  The Articles gave Congress the power to 
conclude treaties, but they did not establish a mechanism for their enforcement.”); Yoo, 
supra note 33, at 2013 (“Foreign policy failures were central to the primary defect in the 
Articles [of Confederation’s] treaty making structure . . . .  Inability to command compliance 
with its foreign policy virtually ensured Congress’[s] failure . . . .”). 
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determinations.  To produce uniformity in these determinations, they 
ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL.36 
2.  Foreign Relations Enforcement Failure:  The Case of the 1783 Treaty of 
Peace 
In return for recognition of the United States’ independence and 
territorial boundaries, the 1783 Treaty of Peace provided that “creditors on 
either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full 
value . . . of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”37  However, most 
states did not honor this obligation, and instead passed laws to confiscate or 
make uncollectable debt held by British creditors.38  Not only did the 
British retaliate for violations of the treaty by refusing to leave militarily 
and commercially strategic forts they occupied in the northern frontier,39 
but American failure to enforce the treaty caused problems with other 
nations.40  Concluding treaties with other countries became difficult,41 and 
 
 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 37. See Treaty of Peace, supra note 31, at art. IV.  In addition to the debt provision, the 
United States also agreed that Congress would recommend to the states that British loyalists 
receive compensation for property confiscated during the war and that no other actions 
would be taken against individuals due to the war. Id. at art. V–VI. 
 38. See JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 
94 (2002) (“Both during and after the Revolution, state courts were notoriously frosty to 
British creditors trying to collect debts from American citizens, and state legislatures went so 
far as to hobble British debt collection by statute, despite the specific provision of the 1783 
Treaty of Paris . . . .”); see also FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL:  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1973) (“Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and all states to the south were preventing British merchants from 
collecting prewar debts which had been guaranteed under Article IV [of the Treaty of 
Peace].”); Lee, supra note 33, at 1829–30, 1860–61 (discussing problems with state 
compliance with the 1783 Treaty of Peace and measures, including judicial enforcement, 
developed to resolve state non-compliance with treaty obligations); Yoo, supra note 33, at 
2015 (noting states that had “either passed laws that confiscated debts owed to British 
citizens, or prevented the collection of such debts after Congress’s ratification of the treaty”). 
 39. See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S TREATY:  A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 
4–5 (1923) (“[T]hat the United States was not loyally fulfilling its obligations under the 
treaty is the first expression of recrimination . . . which American representatives 
encountered during the next ten years whenever the delivery of the posts was demanded.”); 
MARKS, supra note 38, at 11 (noting British responses to questions regarding the “frontier 
posts” “was invariably the same:  the United States had violated the treaty first, and as soon 
as the offending states fulfilled their treaty responsibilities the frontier posts would be 
vacated”); Yoo, supra note 33, at 2015.  The British used state breaches of the Treaty of 
Peace as a justification for the British failure to turn over economically valuable forts as 
agreed by the Treaty of Peace. See Letter from John Adams to John Jay (May 25, 1786), in 8 
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 394 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1853) (“By the answer of 
Lord Carmarthen to the memorial of the 30th of November, congress will see that the 
detention of the posts is attempted to be justified by the laws of certain States impeding the 
course of law for the recovery of old debts. . . .”); MARKS, supra note 38, at 9–10 (discussing 
the economic benefits that were dependent on British withdrawal from the posts). 
 40. See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End:  The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1276–77 (2008) 
(discussing problems caused by being an “unreliable treaty partner”); Vázquez, supra note 
33, at 617 (“Congress had concluded a number of treaties . . . but the states violated them, 
causing significant problems for the fledgling nation. . . . The Founders were anxious to 
avoid treaty violations because such violations threatened to provoke wars and otherwise 
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the failure of some states to comply with treaties in force meant that no 
states could get the benefits of those treaties.42 
3.  The Supremacy Clause and Federal Control of Foreign Relations Policy 
As part of the remedy for problems experienced under the Articles of 
Confederation, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution specifically binds 
judges to uphold “Treaties” as the “supreme Law of the Land.”43  
Commentators disagree about the original intent of the Founders to 
establish an assumption that all treaties would automatically receive 
Supremacy Clause effect.44  However, there is consensus that, when 
Supremacy Clause effect is present it functions to make treaties supreme 
over state laws,45 and that the Supremacy Clause sought to remedy the 
problem of enforcing national foreign policy.46  In addition, Article III of 
the Constitution extended judicial power to reach cases arising under 
Treaties.47  It has been recognized that a key role envisioned for the federal 
 
complicate relations with more powerful nations.”); cf. Lee, supra note 33, at 1829 (“The 
documentary record is replete with affirmations of Madison’s and Marshall’s acute concern 
that a State’s particular difficulties in adhering to U.S. treaty obligations with a foreign state 
would drag the entire United States into war . . . .”); id. at 1850–51 (discussing potential 
consequences of treaty violations at the time of the framing of the Constitution). 
 41. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1277. 
 42. The breach by a state justified other nations’ breach of treaty agreements. See 
Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1277 (“[B]ecause the country was unable to live up to many of 
the agreements it had managed to negotiate, its treaty partners felt justified in doing the 
same.”); Lee, supra note 33, at 1850 (“As a matter of international law . . . it was immaterial 
whether the national government or a State occasioned breach of a ratified treaty of the 
United States.  The treaty had been breached, and the offended sovereign treaty partner had 
legal rights of redress.”); supra note 39. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 44. Compare Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?:  Historical Scholarship, Original 
Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land”, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 
(1999) (arguing that the prevailing view that the Founders intended treaties to be self-
executing is supported by history, in particular the text of the Supremacy Clause; the votes 
and debates at the Constitutional Convention; and ratification evidence), with Yoo, supra 
note 33 (arguing for a presumption of non-self-execution on the grounds that neither the 
Supremacy Clause nor its history indicate that the status of a treaty as the supreme law of the 
land was to be achieved through direct judicial enforcement, and that non-self-execution 
allows the political branches necessary discretion to conduct foreign policy).  For Supreme 
Court decisions on self-execution doctrine, see infra Part I.C. 
 45. See Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456–57 (1806) (“[T]he treaty says that 
the creditor shall meet with no legal impediment; and the constitution of the United States 
declares the treaty to be the supreme law of the land[.]  The [Virginia] act of limitations, 
therefore, must yield to the treaty.  In the case of Ware v. Hylton, this court, upon very 
solemn argument, decided, that the treaty not only repealed all the state laws which operated 
as impediments, but nullified all acts done, and all rights acquired, under such laws, which 
tended to obstruct the creditor’s right of recovery.” (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
199 (1796))); Yoo, supra note 33, at 2074 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause declared the 
superiority of treaties to state law . . . .”). 
 46. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”); see also 2 DEBATES OF THE 
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 454–55 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) 
(statement of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention) (“The judicial power 
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judiciary, and a driving force in its creation, was the alternative forum 
federal courts could provide, thereby providing relief from state practices 
disruptive of national foreign relations and commercial activities.48  In 
short, states could not opt out of treaties, and because the courts were bound 
to uphold a treaty just as any other federal law, enforcement could and did 
occur.49 
In addition to the enforcement power provided by the Supremacy Clause, 
the Constitution, in Article I, section 10, explicitly limits state power to 
engage in foreign relations.50  This section provides that “[n]o State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,”51 and “[n]o State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact 
with another State, or with a foreign Power.”52  In contrast, the Constitution 
explicitly grants full power over many areas of foreign relations to the 
federal branches of government.53 
Other limits to state power in foreign relations are not explicitly stated 
but are instead implied by the structure of the Constitution and the federal 
 
extends to all cases arising under treaties made, or which shall be made by the United States. 
. . . This clause, sir, will [show] the world that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional 
part of the character of the United States; that we secure its performance no longer 
nominally, for the judges of the United States will be enabled to carry into effect, let the 
legislatures of the different states do what they may.”). 
 48. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 
U.S. 88, 94–95 (2002) (“This penchant of the state courts to disrupt international relations 
and discourage foreign investment led directly to the alienage jurisdiction provided by 
Article III of the Constitution. . . . ‘[T]he proponents of the Constitution . . . made it quite 
clear that the elimination or amelioration of difficulties with credit was the principal reason 
for having the alienage and diversity jurisdictions, and that it was one of the most important 
reasons for a federal judiciary.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Wythe 
Holt, “To Establish Justice”:  Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the 
Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1473)); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (“The 
judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”). 
 49. Treaties were often enforced against state laws to protect the national interest by 
enforcing obligations already incurred and thereby securing the benefits of the treaty as well 
as cooperation with other countries in securing future treaties. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. 
Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1879) (preempting state law to provide a treaty based right 
and holding that a liberal interpretation to secure rights granted by a treaty is preferred to a 
restrictive interpretation); see also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (“It is a 
general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall be liberally construed, 
so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity 
between them.”); Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1285 (“Between 1791 and 1835, more than 
twenty percent of the cases heard by the Supreme Court involved foreign or international 
law.  A full thirty of these early cases involved the Treaties of Peace with Great Britain.”). 
 50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 51. Id. at cl. 1. 
 52. Id. at cl. 3. 
 53. The Constitution grants Congress the following foreign relations powers in Article I, 
Section 8:  regulation of foreign commerce; regulation of naturalization and immigration; 
criminalization and punishment of piracy and other felonies on the high seas and offenses 
against international law; the power to declare war; the power to authorize private citizens to 
retaliate against citizens or ships of foreign nations; and the power to raise, regulate, and 
maintain an army and navy. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3–4, 10–14.  In addition, Article II 
grants the President power to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate, and to appoint ambassadors. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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system created under the Constitution.54  For example, although not 
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, areas clearly related to and 
necessary for regulating foreign relations are thought to implicitly belong to 
the federal government.55  This leads to two possible limits on state power 
in the area of foreign relations.  First, because it is implied that the federal 
government has complete power over foreign relations, if a state law 
conflicts with federal law, the latter prevails.56  Second, federal power over 
foreign relations may be considered exclusive.57  For example, in what is 
known as field preemption58 or dormant foreign affairs preemption,59 if the 
 
 54. The United States federal system separates powers between those expressly granted 
to the federal government (the enumerated powers) and those reserved to the states or the 
people. Compare id. at art. I, § 8, and art. II, § 2, with id. at amend. X.  For example, in 
1819, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, “This government is acknowledged by all to be one 
of enumerated powers.  The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is 
now universally admitted.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).   
Those powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution are called express or 
enumerated powers. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1288 (9th ed. 2009).  In addition, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants implied power for Congress to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411–12 (defining the scope of 
“necessary and proper”). 
 55. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (“Although there is in the 
Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective 
regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-
making organ of the Nation.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
318 (1936) (“The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to 
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in 
the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of 
nationality.”); id. at 319 (“‘The President is the constitutional representative of the United 
States with regard to foreign nations.  He manages our concerns with foreign nations . . . .’” 
(quoting S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 14TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REP. OF FEB. 15, 1816, 
reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 56-231, pt. 6, at 21 (1901))); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 
(1933) (“As a nation with all the attributes of sovereignty, the United States is vested with all 
the powers of government necessary to maintain an effective control of international 
relations.”). See generally George Sutherland, The Internal and External Powers of the 
National Government, 191 N. AM. REV. 373 (1910) (explaining the source of non-
enumerated federal foreign relations power). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 
88, 108 (1992) (“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is 
derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which 
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’” (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 
131, 138 (1988))). 
 57. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[T]he Act of 
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”). But see 
G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 
VA. L. REV. 1, 21–26 (1999) (comparing the view that the Constitution seemed to make the 
treaty power exclusive to the federal government with an orthodox “reserved-powers-
centered” view of federalism that would allow states to operate in the field of foreign 
relations where the federal government had not acted). 
 58. Field preemption occurs when there is extensive federal regulation such that the 
“field excludes state and local actions.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 406 (3d ed. 2006).  Criteria for this can include the requirement 
that the field is unique to the federal government’s role, that Congress’s intent is to eliminate 
dual federal and state regulation, or that there is a potential risk of state law impeding the 
2222 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
state law is essentially a foreign affairs regulation, the state law is 
preempted.60  This is so even if the state law is not in conflict with the 
federal law regulating the area61 and even in the absence of a federal law 
directly regulating the area.62  Likewise, dormant foreign commerce clause 
power63 prevents states from overly burdening foreign commerce64 or 
 
federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 401–02, 408–09.  However, field preemption may be 
avoided if there is an important traditional state interest in the regulation. Id. at 409. 
 59. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1262–64 
(2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of dormant foreign affairs preemption).  An 
argument has also been made that the federal treaty power has preemptive effect such that 
state laws that would interfere with the ability of the national government to negotiate 
treaties are invalid even in the absence of a treaty. See generally Edward T. Swaine, 
Negotiating Federalism:  State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 
1127, 1138 (2000) (arguing that there is 1 dormant treaty power that preempts states from 
engaging in activities that would burden the federal government’s ability to negotiate with 
other nations regarding areas of national concern). 
 60. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (“[W]e conclude that the 
history and operation of this Oregon statute make clear that [it] is an intrusion by the State 
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the 
Congress”). 
 61. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941) (“When the national 
government by treaty or statute has established rules and regulations touching the rights, 
privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of 
the land.  No state can add to or take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute . . . .  
The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight 
states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with 
foreign sovereignties.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 403 (describing the 
preemption in Hines as noteworthy because the state law “complemented the federal law”). 
 62. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440–41 (“The several States, of course, have traditionally 
regulated the descent and distribution of estates.  But those regulations must give way if they 
impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy. . . . Certainly a State could not 
deny admission to a traveler from East Germany nor bar its citizens from going there.  If 
there are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the Federal Government.  The 
present Oregon law is not as gross an intrusion in the federal domain . . . [but] it has a direct 
impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central 
government to deal with those problems.” (citations omitted)). 
 63. Dormant commerce clause power is a related concept, and is defined as “[t]he 
constitutional principle that the Commerce Clause prevents state regulation of interstate 
commercial activity even when Congress has not acted under its Commerce Clause power to 
regulate that activity.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 305.  With foreign 
commerce, however, “because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated,” the 
constitutional limits on state power may be broader than with interstate commerce. Kraft 
Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); accord Japan 
Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979) (“When construing Congress’[s] power 
to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ a more extensive constitutional inquiry is 
required.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)). 
 64. See, e.g., Kraft Gen. Foods, 505 U.S. at 79, 81 (“[T]he Foreign Commerce Clause 
recognizes that discriminatory treatment of foreign commerce may create problems, such as 
the potential for international retaliation, that concern the Nation as a whole. . . . Absent a 
compelling justification . . . a State may not advance its legitimate goals by means that 
facially discriminate against foreign commerce.”); cf. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 
769 (1945) (“For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the 
commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection 
from state legislation inimical to the national commerce . . . .”). 
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preventing the federal government from speaking in one voice about foreign 
commerce.65 
B.  The Treaty Power and Its Limits:  Separation of Powers, Federalism, 
and Powers Reserved to the States 
While the federal system set up by the Constitution provides supremacy 
to federal law in the area of enumerated powers, the Constitution provides 
safeguards against dominance by one branch by balancing the roles of 
various branches as well as safeguards to state power by reserving 
unenumerated powers to the states.66  This section first explains the types of 
treaties available under United States law and the roles of the executive and 
legislative branches in treaty law making. 
1.  Article II Treaties and Other International Agreements 
The Constitution gives the President, with the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate, the power to ratify treaties.67  In the United States, 
these treaties are referred to as Article II treaties.68  It is generally these 
treaties that have Supremacy Clause force, with the qualification, of course, 
that an Article II treaty deemed non-self-executing would first require the 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate69 and a second round of consent by a 
majority of the Senate as well as the House of Representatives to be given 
Supremacy Clause effect by U.S. courts.70  However, under international 
 
 65. See Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448, 451 (“[A] state tax on the instrumentalities of 
foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is 
essential.  Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern. . . . [A] court 
must . . .  inquire . . . whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with 
one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.’  If a state tax 
contravenes . . . [this] precept[], it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.” (quoting 
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))). But see Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324–27 (1994) (finding no preemption when there had 
been numerous congressional studies and bills introduced that would have prohibited the 
type of state tax in question, but Congress did not pass legislation); id. at 330–31 (“The 
Constitution does ‘not make the judiciary the overseer of our government.’ . . . [W]e leave it 
to Congress—whose voice, in this area, is the Nation’s—to evaluate whether the national 
interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy.” (quoting Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981))). 
 66. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (legislative powers), with art. II (executive 
powers), and art. III (judicial powers). 
 67. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 68. See id.  Strictly speaking, the term “treaty,” under U.S. constitutional law, refers 
only to Article II treaties and not to other agreements. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 
29–30 (1982). 
 69. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; White, supra note 57, at 9–21 (discussing the 
Article II “treaty-centered” approach of treaty jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the development of executive agreements); infra Part I.C. 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3 (prescribing how a bill can become law); cf. 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 204–05 (1996) 
(discussing Congress’s ability and obligation to implement treaties by enacting legislation). 
2224 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
law, any agreement properly entered into by a nation is considered a treaty, 
in the sense that it creates international obligations.71   
 In addition to Article II treaties, internationally binding agreements 
include congressional-executive agreements and sole executive 
agreements.72  A congressional-executive agreement is a treaty (in the sense 
that it creates international obligations) that the President negotiates, and 
which Congress implements domestically by enacting legislation to enforce 
the treaty.73  These agreements do not require the consent of two-thirds of 
the Senate, but instead require a simple majority of both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate in order to pass the law that will enforce the 
treaty.74  A sole executive agreement is also a treaty in the international 
sense that it creates binding obligations on the United States, but with a sole 
executive agreement, Congress does not enact legislation.75  Instead, the 
agreement is made by the President and is upheld by the courts against 
conflicting state action when the sole executive agreement is found to be 
within the President’s power.76 
 
See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (providing an example of one such 
Article II treaty and upholding both the treaty and its implementing legislation). 
 71. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (representing, for the most part, the 
customary international law that governs enforcement of treaty obligations).  The binding 
nature of treaties does not depend on the Supremacy Clause, but rather on customary 
international law. See infra note 109.  The inability of the United States to comply with its 
binding obligations was in fact one reason for the adoption of the Supremacy Clause. See 
supra Part I.A.1–2; supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 72. See HENKIN, supra note 70, at 215–30. 
 73. See id. at 215–16; see also Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 30–31 (recognizing that 
Congress has used the term treaty in statutes to refer to congressional-executive agreements 
as well as Article II treaties). See generally Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1289–1301 
(discussing the history and development of congressional-executive agreements). 
 74. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1239. 
 75. See HENKIN, supra note 70, at 222 (“One is compelled to conclude that there are 
agreements which the President can make on his sole authority . . . .”); see also United States 
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 233–34 (1942) (holding that under the terms of a sole executive 
agreement, New York was preempted from seizing the assets of a state branch of a 
nationalized Russian insurance company); Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1239. Compare 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303(4) 
(1986) (“The President, on his own authority, may make an international agreement dealing 
with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution.”), with id. § 
303(4) cmt. a (noting that agreements in subsection 4 are referred to as sole executive 
agreements).  For a discussion on the constitutionality of sole executive agreements, see 
White, supra note 57, at 9, 15–21, 77–120. 
 76. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17, 421, 427 (2003) 
(finding state law preempted by foreign relations policy contained in sole executive 
agreements); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660, 682–83, 686–88 (1981) 
(upholding a claims settlement agreement with Iran made solely by the President); Pink, 315 
U.S. at 229 (“The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations included the 
power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the United 
States . . . .”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (upholding an 
international compact “within the competence of the President” as valid without consent of 
the Senate). 
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2.  Missouri v. Holland and Lawmaking Through Treaties 
The extent of the federal government’s power to make binding law 
through treaties was contested in the 1920 case of Missouri v. Holland.77  In 
Holland, the Supreme Court held that a traditional state area of regulation78 
could be preempted by federal law grounded in a treaty.79  This conflict 
between a traditional state power and federal foreign relations power arose 
after 1916, when the President concluded an Article II treaty with Great 
Britain.80  The treaty provided that both countries would propose legislation 
protecting migratory birds, as necessary, to execute the treaty.81  Congress 
then enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,82 which made it “unlawful to 
hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] . . . sell . . . any migratory bird” except as 
allowed by federal regulation.83  The State of Missouri brought a 
constitutional challenge to the Act.84  At that time, regulation of birds was 
not considered part of Congress’s enumerated powers, and Missouri argued 
that this power was reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.85  
Additionally, Missouri argued that lawmaking through treaties should not 
go beyond enumerated lawmaking powers.86 
The Supreme Court held that in this situation, Congress could pass 
legislation that would normally be outside of its enumerated powers.87  The 
Court reasoned that it was “a necessary and proper means to execute the 
powers of the Government,” as allowed by Article I, section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution.88  The Court concluded that because the treaty power was a 
delegated power and treaties made under the authority of the United States 
are the supreme law of the land, there could be no dispute about the validity 
of the statute if the treaty were valid.89 
In examining the validity of the treaty and the limits of lawmaking 
through treaties, the Court noted that while “[a]cts of Congress are the 
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the 
 
 77. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 78. See id. at 432; White, supra note 57, at 64–65, 65 n.227. 
 79. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 432–33. 
 80. See Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat 1702; see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 
431. 
 81. See Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds, supra note 80, at art. VIII; see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 431; White, supra 
note 57, at 62–67 (providing background of the treaty and dispute in Holland). 
 82. 65 Pub. L. No. 186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918). 
 83. Id. § 2; see also Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. 
 84. Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31. 
 85. See id. at 431 (“The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional 
interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, and that the acts 
of the defendant done and threatened under that authority invade the sovereign right of the 
State and contravene its will manifested in statutes.”); cf. id. at 432 (“An earlier act of 
Congress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a treaty to regulate the killing of 
migratory birds within the States had been held bad in the District Court.”). 
 86. See id. at 431–32. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 89. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432. 
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Constitution . . . treaties are declared to be so when made under the 
authority of the United States.”90  The Court found this to indicate that the 
limitations on the treaty power “must be ascertained in a different way.”91  
The Court concluded that the treaty was valid because the interest at stake 
was “a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude” that could “be 
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power.”92  
Following Holland, some lawmakers grew concerned that American 
liberties could be abrogated through the Article II treaty process or sole 
executive agreements.93  Today it is well settled that all treaties are subject 
to the Constitution.94  However, concerns related to federalism and 
separation of powers continue to provide reasons for limiting automatic 
enforcement of treaties or curtailing the effect of international treaties and 
agreements that implicate areas of traditional state concern.95 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Treaty Jurisprudence:  Development and 
Application of the Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Distinction 
1.  Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties:  The Legacy of Foster 
v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman 
a.  Origins of the Self-Executing versus Non-Self-Executing Treaty 
Distinction 
While there is some disagreement over whether it was originally intended 
that all treaties be presumed to have Supremacy Clause effect 
automatically,96 Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court 
in Foster v. Neilson,97 foreclosed the idea that all treaties are always 
automatically enforceable in domestic courts.98  Foster has been used to 
ensconce two treaty possibilities:  (1) those that operate directly on their 
object “without the aid of any legislative provision,” and (2) those that are 
like contracts for performance by the legislature and require Congress to 
“execute” the treaty by passing implementing legislation “before it can 
 
 90. Id. at 433. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 435. 
 93. See generally The Bricker Amendment:  A Cure Worse than the Disease?, TIME, July 
13, 1953, at 20.  To address these fears, a series of amendments known as the Bricker 
Amendments were proposed but never ratified. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1302; Louis 
Henkin, Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:  The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L. 341, 348–49 (1995). 
 94. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1957). 
 95. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 93, at 345 (discussing the motivations and use of non-
self-executing and federalism reservations and declarations). 
 96. See supra notes 30, 44 and accompanying text. 
 97. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829). 
 98. See id. at 314–15; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“This 
Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as 
domestic law, and those that . . . do not . . . .  The distinction was well explained by Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson . . . .” (citing Foster, 27 U.S. at 315)). 
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become a rule for the Court.”99  Today, the first category of treaties is 
referred to as self-executing treaties, while the second category is referred 
to as non-self-executing treaties.100 
b.  Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman 
Foster is interesting because it dealt with an 1819 Treaty of Amity101 
between the United States and Spain that was found to be non-self-
executing.102  Four years later, Chief Justice Marshall returned to the same 
treaty in United States v. Percheman,103 but in this case found the treaty to 
be self-executing.104  Despite this about-face, Percheman reiterated the 
treaty execution language and textual analysis of Foster, thereby inculcating 
or illuminating, depending on your perspective, the two forms of treaty 
execution and the proper mode of judicial interpretation.105 
Foster started with the proposition that “[a] treaty is in its nature a 
contract between two nations, not a legislative act.”106  Analogizing a treaty 
to a contract fits well with the current conception of international treaty law, 
which recognizes that treaties are ultimately agreements between nations 
that gain force of law through the formal expressed intention of nations to 
be bound by a treaty.107  Similar to the way in which individual parties can 
contract around common law rules that would otherwise govern their 
relationship, countries can establish rules to change,108 supplement, or 
ensure the application of customary international law.109  However, Foster 
used the comparison in a different sense. 
 
 99. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
 100. The Supreme Court first used the term “self-executing” in Bartram v. Robertson, 
122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887). Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 
766 (1988).  The Court used the term in explaining that “stipulations [of a treaty with 
Denmark], even if conceded to be self-executing” did not cover the dispute before the Court. 
Bartram, 122 U.S. at 120.  A year later, the Court again used the term, stating, “[b]y the 
Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing . . . with an act of legislation. . . . [I]f the 
two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the 
stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 
190, 194 (1888). 
 101. Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252. 
 102. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
 103. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 104. Id. at 89.  The difference in the outcomes hinged on the difference between the 
English version of the treaty and the Spanish version of the treaty. See id. at 88–89; see also 
infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. 
 105. See Percheman, 32 U.S. at 88–89. 
 106. Foster, 27 U.S. at 313. 
 107. See generally VCLT, supra note 71.  Treaty law is similar to contract law in terms of 
formation, interpretation, performance, breach, and defenses for breach. See id. at arts. 26, 
31–32, 60–62. 
 108. Just as with contract law, there are some things countries cannot contract around 
through a treaty. Id. at art. 53.  For example, treaties that violate preemptory norms (also 
known as jus cogens), such as any that contemplate universally unacceptable acts such as 
slavery or genocide, are invalid and unenforceable. See id.  Similar to contracts, treaties can 
also be invalidated for error, fraud, corruption, or coercion. See id. at art. 48–52. 
 109. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is itself an example of a 
treaty that primarily encapsulates what was already established customary law. See, e.g., 
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Chief Justice Marshall was coming from an understanding of treaties as 
they are under the British system or one like it when he wrote that “[a 
treaty] does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; 
especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into 
execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the 
instrument.”110  In the British system, all treaties require a parliamentary act 
to have any domestic force of law.111  Chief Justice Marshall next 
acknowledged that “[i]n the United States a different principle is 
established.  Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.”112  
The conclusion Chief Justice Marshall articulated was that where treaties 
are not like contracts, in the sense of a contract to be performed, they are 
“to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the 
legislature.”113  If this is not the case, then the treaty is addressed “to the 
political . . . department” and requires their performance to satisfy the 
obligation it represents.114  Thus, instead of moving from a system where 
all treaties presumptively require legislation to one where presumptively no 
treaties require legislation, Foster contemplates a system where either 
situation is possible depending on the text and context of the treaty itself.115 
c.  Non-Self-Executing Treaty Categories 
Under Foster and Medellin, a treaty is itself instructive of whether or not 
it is self-executing.116  Under this view, courts have held treaties to be non-
 
De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008).  The United 
States is not a party to the VCLT, but it recognizes the majority of its provisions as 
customary international law binding on the United States. Id. 
 110. Foster, 27 U.S. at 313–14. 
 111. See Ware v. Hylton 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 273–74 (1796) (discussing the difference in 
the British rule of treaty implementation which requires an act of Parliament to give effect to 
treaties made by the King). 
 112. Foster, 27 U.S. at 314. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id.; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“Foster . . . held 
that a treaty is ‘equivalent to an act of the legislature,’ and hence self-executing, when it 
‘operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.’” (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. at 
314)). 
 116. But see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 695, 702 & n.36 (1995) (arguing that having no presumption either for or 
against self-execution practically acts as a presumption against self-execution); Vázquez, 
supra note 33, at 601–02 (arguing the Supremacy Clause is best read to create a presumption 
that treaties are self-executing in the “Foster sense”:  unless the treaty itself indicates a need 
for legislative implementation, the treaty operates of itself).  Some commentators make the 
argument that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing, whereas others argue that the 
Supremacy Clause establishes a presumption of self-execution. Compare Yoo, supra note 
33, at 2074 (“[T]he Framers did not understand [the Supremacy Clause] to override the 
separation of powers principle that treaties that sought to have a domestic, legislative effect 
could not take effect without congressional implementation.”), with Paust, supra note 100, at 
760 (“[T]he distinction found in certain cases between ‘self-executing’ and ‘non-self-
executing’ treaties is a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with express 
language in the Constitution affirming that ‘all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)). 
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self-executing in what one commentator has distinguished as four separate 
categories.117  First, a treaty may be held to be non-self-executing if a court 
finds that was the “intent” of the treaty makers as expressed in the treaty 
itself.118  For example, the English translation of the treaty in Foster 
contained the phrase “shall be ratified and confirmed,” and the Court found 
this to indicate an intention for future action.119  Likewise, the Spanish 
translation of the same treaty contained the phrase “shall remain ratified and 
confirmed,” and the Court, armed with this translation, found that it became 
clear that the treaty was self-executing.120  Another example is a treaty that 
the United States ratifies with a specific declaration that the treaty is non-
self-executing with the intent to preclude the treaty from providing a 
vehicle for private litigation.121  For example, in ratifying the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,122 the 
United States included a declaration “that the provisions of the Convention 
are not self-executing.”123  The United States further indicated that the 
intent was to preclude the creation of a private right of action in U.S. courts 
based on the treaty, in preference of relying on legal remedies already in 
place.124 
Second, the treaty may contemplate an obligation that constitutionally 
requires legislation to take effect, for example if the treaty purports to 
criminalize behavior or provide appropriations.125  These non-self-
executing treaties do not raise the question of the meaning of the 
Supremacy Clause because they go beyond the constitutional power of a 
 
 117. See generally Vázquez, supra note 116. 
 118. Id. at 700–04 (finding Foster to fall within the intent-based category). But see White, 
supra note 57, at 26 n.75 (citing Foster as an example of a foreign relations case that presents 
a political question).  An 1876 treaty with Hawaii discussed in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 
U.S. 190 (1888), may also be considered an example of intent-based non-self-execution. Id. 
at 192–93. But see David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:  Exposing a Constitutional 
Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 31–35 (2002) (arguing that the best interpretation of the 
Court’s decision in Whitney is that the Hawaii treaty requires implementing legislation 
because it implicates Congress’s exclusive lawmaking power for raising revenue). 
 119. Foster, 27 U.S. at 313. 
 120. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833) (“Although the words 
‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ are properly the words of contract, stipulating for some 
future legislative act; they are not necessarily so.  They may import that they ‘shall be 
ratified and confirmed’ by force of the instrument itself.  When we observe that in the 
counterpart of the same treaty, executed at the same time by the same parties, they are used 
in this sense, we think the construction proper, if not unavoidable.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 93, at 346 (discussing the use of non-self-executing 
declarations in human rights treaties). 
 122. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1994). 
 123. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Third Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 
1999, Addendum, United States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1, ∂ 169 (Oct. 10, 
2000), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/100306.pdf; see also supra notes 
93–95 and accompanying text; infra note 175. 
 124. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 123, at 43–44. 
 125. Vázquez, supra note 116, at 718–19. 
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treaty.  That is, a treaty is not constitutional if it attempts to do what it 
cannot under the Constitution.126 
Third, treaties may be incapable of or inappropriate for judicial action.127  
For example, if a treaty says only that the parties shall advance 
environmental stability, this alone is too vague to be justiciable because it 
does not explain what counts as stability or what advancing stability 
entails.128  Similarly, if a treaty expresses a desire for action in a non-
binding way through the use of terms like “use our best efforts” or 
“cooperate,” the treaty is too aspirational for judicial enforcement.129  In 
both these cases the treaties present a political question of how best to fulfill 
the treaty.130  In other words, they present issues that are appropriate for the 
political branches of government and not appropriate for the judicial 
branch.131  Treaties held to be non-self-executing on this basis can be said 
to deal with the concern of separation of power:  safeguarding against 
tyranny by balancing and keeping separate the powers delegated to the three 
branches of government.132 
Similar to these situations is the case where treaties require “domestic 
procedures and institutions” that do not exist in order to fulfill the 
obligations.133  Courts may also stretch the inquiry into what likely impact 
judicial enforcement would have.134  Deciding self-execution on this basis, 
however, has been criticized for asking “courts to engage in an open-ended 
inquiry to determine on a case-by-case basis whether judicial enforcement 
of a particular treaty is a good idea.”135 
 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 713–15. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. at 710–13; see, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008); see also 
Vázquez, supra note 33, at 661 (“The Medellin opinion indicates that the Court concluded 
that ICJ judgments are not directly enforceable in the courts because Article 94, in effect, 
obligates the United States to do its best to comply with ICJ judgments.”).  The U.N. 
Charter, one of the treaty sources for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment that 
was at issue in Medellin, states, “Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply 
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.” 
U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1.  In Medellin, the Supreme Court found that the phrase 
“undertakes to comply,” unlike “‘shall’ or ‘must’ comply,” indicates a non-self-executing 
nature. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 508. 
 130. Vazquez, supra note 116, at 714–15. 
 131. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58, at 129–30 (explaining the Political Question 
Doctrine as subject matter that the Court deems inappropriate for judicial review and that 
should be left to the politically accountable branches of government). 
 132. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 133. People of Saipan by Guerrero v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 
1974); Vázquez, supra note 116, at 715–18. 
 134. Professor Carlos Manuel Vázquez has characterized tests such as those contemplated 
by People of Saipan, 502 F.2d at 97 (listing contextual factors to be examined as “the 
purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures 
and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the availability and feasibility of 
alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences of 
self- or non-self-execution”), as a “free-wheeling inquiry into the treaty’s judicial 
enforceability.” Vázquez, supra note 116, at 715. 
 135. Vázquez, supra note 116, at 715–17. 
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Finally, treaties have been held to be non-self-executing because they fail 
to provide a right of private action.136  This category, however, is not a 
correct basis for finding a treaty to be non-self-executing because treaties, 
like statutes—whether self-executing or not—may not confer a private right 
of action.137  This view has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in 
Medellin, as the Court indicated in dicta that whether a treaty provides a 
private right of action is a separate inquiry from whether it is self-
executing.138  This is important because the private right of action could be 
provided by common law or another treaty or statute.139  Additionally, a 
treaty could provide a defense rather than a positive right.140 
2.  Medellin v. Texas 
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding the Supremacy 
Clause effect of a treaty came in the 2008 case of Medellin.141  In this 
decision, the Court considered whether an International Court of Justice142 
judgment obligating the United States to review and reconsider143 a 
particular case was binding in U.S. domestic courts.144  The Court held that 
Texas state procedural rules145 were not preempted by the ICJ judgment 
 
 136. Id. at 719 & n.114. 
 137. See id. at 719. 
 138. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008). 
 139. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) 
(standing for the proposition that treaties concerned with the rights of property by descent or 
inheritance confer a private right of action and such treaty provisions stand on equal footing 
as laws of Congress); Vázquez, supra note 116, at 720–21. 
 140. See Vázquez, supra note 116, at 721. 
 141. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491. 
 142. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the United Nations’ “principal judicial 
organ.” U.N. Charter art. 92. 
 143. In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), the ICJ found that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (VCCR), supra note 10, by failing to notify many of the Mexican 
nationals named in Avena of their right to communicate with their consulate. Avena, 2004 
I.C.J. ∂ 128.  The ICJ found that “appropriate reparation . . . consist[ed] . . . [of] the 
obligation of the United States of America to provide, by means of its own choosing, review 
and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences” of 51 Mexican nationals, id. ∂ 153(9), 
“without regard to state procedural default rules,” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503. 
 144. José Ernesto Medellín had appealed his conviction for the rape and murder of two 
teenage girls on the basis of a VCCR violation by Texas state officials. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 
498.  Whenever a United States official, including local law enforcement, acts in his or her 
official capacity, this action is attributable to the United States as a matter of customary 
international law binding on the United States. See, e.g., id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t was Texas that—by failing to provide consular notice in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention—ensnared the United States in the current controversy.”); Application of 
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 191, ∂ 385 (Feb. 26) (“[C]onduct of any State organ . . . gives rise 
to the responsibility of the State if it constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.”); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that 
“[i]nternational law is part of our law”). 
 145. State procedural rules automatically bar defendants from raising an issue on appeal if 
they failed to raise the issue in a timely fashion before the end of their trial. See, e.g., 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89–90 (1977) (upholding and discussing the benefits of 
the contemporaneous objection rule in maintaining the integrity of the United States 
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because the treaties that allegedly required the United States to be bound by 
the ICJ judgment were non-self-executing.146 
The Court focused on the self-executing/non-self-executing treaty 
distinction147 and indicated that the rationale underlying the importance of 
the treaty distinction is based in constitutional principles of separation of 
powers.148  Specifically, “[t]he point of a non-self-executing treaty is that it 
‘addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department.’”149  As the 
Court explained, the Framers established checks and balances in the law 
making process.150  Additionally, the Court made clear that the power to 
make law, both through statute and treaties, is vested in the political 
branches, not the judicial branch, and that power is further balanced by 
requiring separate executive and legislative action.151  For this reason, when 
a treaty is not intended to be self-executing, the court cannot enforce it as 
law, because it is not yet actually law under proper constitutional 
procedures.152  For courts to enforce non-implemented non-self-executing 
treaties would in effect be a form of judicial lawmaking, and this would be 
an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.153 
 
adversarial justice system); Ex parte Medellin, 280 S.W.3d 854, 855, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2008) (explaining the contemporaneous objection rule which “applies in every jurisdiction in 
America”).  In addition, the Supreme Court has held that, like other federal claims, Article 
36 VCCR claims are subject to procedural bars. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 
360 (2006); accord Medellin, 552 U.S. at 498–99; Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375–76 
(1998) (citing Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 53). 
 146. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 (“Because none of these . . . treaty sources [of the ICJ 
judgment] creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and 
because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the [ICJ] judgment 
is not automatically binding domestic law.”); see also id. at 522–23 (“In sum, . . . [the 
judgment] does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state 
restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions.”). 
 147. See, e.g., id. at 504–06.  In determining whether a treaty was self-executing, the 
Court reaffirmed the inquiry presented in Foster. Id. at 504–05.  The Court defined the term 
self-executing to mean a “treaty [that] has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon 
ratification.” Id. at 505 n.2.  The Court defined the term non-self-execution as the converse, 
stating that it is a “treaty [that] does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal 
law,” and “[w]hether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon implementing 
legislation passed by Congress.” Id. 
 148. See id. at 515. 
 149. Id. at 516 (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). 
 150. Id. at 515 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. II, § 2). 
 151. Id.  The Court also noted that international obligations fall within the realm of the 
political branches. See id. at 520 (“Such judgments would still constitute international 
obligations, the proper subject of political and diplomatic negotiations.” (citing Head Money 
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884))). 
 152. Id. at 515 (“Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be 
followed before federal law can be created under the Constitution—vesting that decision in 
the political branches, subject to checks and balances.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7)); see 
also id. at 519 (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the textual provisions 
indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic effect.”). 
 153. See id. at 514–15 (“‘[I]t is not for the federal courts to impose [a remedy] on the 
States through lawmaking of their own.’” (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 
331, 347 (2006))); cf. id. at 516 (“To read a treaty so that it sometimes has the effect of 
domestic law and sometimes does not is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power 
not only to interpret but also to create the law.”). 
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The Court also examined the process of implementing a non-self-
executing treaty in determining whether President George W. Bush154 could 
implement the United States’ treaty-based obligation to comply with the 
ICJ’s Avena judgment.155  The Court again focused on “our constitutional 
system of checks and balances,”156 explaining that in order for treaties to 
attain Supremacy Clause effect, joint action by both the Executive and 
Legislative branches was required, and in the case of a non-self-executing 
treaty, Congress must enact implementing legislation.157 
II.  CAN AN IMPLEMENTED NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATY PREEMPT 
CONFLICTING LAW ALL BY ITSELF? 
Part II examines the major arguments for and against finding that the 
New York Convention, an implemented non-self-executing treaty, has 
Supremacy Clause effect although its implementing legislation does not.  
This part focuses primarily on the Fifth Circuit’s Safety National opinion 
and the decision’s accompanying dissent.  In Safety National, the Fifth 
Circuit held that as an implemented treaty, the New York Convention 
preempts a conflicting Louisiana state law although its implementing 
legislation, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), could not due to reverse 
preemption requirements contained in another federal statute, known as the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA).158  The Second Circuit took the opposite 
position in Stephens, holding that the Supremacy Clause did not cause the 
New York Convention to preempt a conflicting Kentucky state law because 
the New York Convention was non-self-executing.159 
Part II.A provides background on the legal requirements of the FAA, the 
New York Convention, and the MFA, which aids an understanding of the 
conflicts involved in Safety National and Stephens.  Part II.B explains the 
Fifth Circuit Safety National opinion, beginning with an explanation of the 
court’s analysis of the MFA’s application to the Louisiana statute.  Next, 
the Safety National majority and dissenting opinions are presented.  Part 
II.C explains the Second Circuit opinion in Stephens, likewise beginning 
with an explanation of the application of the MFA to the relevant state law, 
in this case a Kentucky statute, before moving to the main issue and 
conclusion. 
 
 154. President George W. Bush had written a memorandum stating “pursuant to [his] 
authority . . . as President[,] . . . the United States” would comply with Avena “by having 
State courts give effect to the decision.” Id. at 503. 
 155. See id. at 523–28. 
 156. Id. at 528. 
 157. See id. at 527. 
 158. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 
717–18, 731 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see infra Part II.B.1. 
 159. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995); see infra Part II.C. 
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A.  Requirements of the New York Convention, the Federal Arbitration Act, 
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
1.  The New York Convention 
a.  Ratification Following Passage of Chapter Two of the Federal 
Arbitration Act 
The New York Convention160 was adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, held from May 20 to 
June 10, 1958 at the U.N. headquarters in New York.161  Although the 
United States participated in the 1958 Convention, it was not a signatory162 
and did not ratify the treaty until Sept. 30, 1970, with entry into force on 
Dec. 29, 1970.163 
Ratification took place after Congress enacted Chapter Two of the FAA 
on July 31, 1970.164  It was thought at the time that without changes to 
United States law, carrying out the New York Convention would be an 
impossible task due to a number of legal and procedural difficulties.165  The 
idea that changes to U.S. law were needed to put the treaty into effect 
applied to both enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration 
 
 160. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 161. See Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius:  
United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1971). 
 162. Id.  At the time of the 1958 Convention, widespread mistrust of arbitration and 
“Bricker Amendment fears” resulted in the United States delegation making a 
recommendation against signature. Id.  The term “Bricker Amendment fears” refers to 
concerns about passing domestic laws through treaties. See supra notes 93–95 and 
accompanying text. 
 163. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status 1958—Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
[hereinafter Convention Status] (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).  While the treaty became 
effective in the United States on December 29, 1970, the United States later extended the 
treaty “to all the territories for the international relations of which the United States of 
America is responsible.” See Aksen, supra note 161, at 24–25.  The signing of a treaty 
normally indicates a nation’s intention to become a party to the treaty, i.e., it indicates a 
nation’s consent to be bound by the treaty. See VCLT, supra note 71, at art 11.  In the United 
States, ratification refers to the Article II treaty process, and is one way the United States 
may make or enter into treaties. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also supra Part I.B.1.  
International obligations undertaken by treaty become effective for a sovereign nation on the 
date the treaty officially enters into force with respect to that nation, either as specified by 
the treaty or after the nation’s consent to be bound has been established. See VCLT, supra 
note 71, at arts 11–16, 24. 
 164. An Act To Implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–208 (2006)). 
 165. Aksen, supra note 161, at 14–16.  Concerns included that no provisions for 
jurisdiction, venue, amount in controversy requirements, or precedent for compelling 
arbitration outside of the United States existed. Id. at 15. 
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agreements.166  For this reason, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented the 
New York Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent with the 
express understanding that the United States would not accede to the New 
York Convention until after the necessary legislative changes had been 
made.167  President Johnson stated, “Changes in Title 9 (Arbitration) of the 
United States Code will be required before the United States becomes a 
party to the Convention.  The United States instrument of accession to the 
Convention will be executed only after the necessary legislation is 
enacted.”168  Chapter Two of the FAA was that legislation.169 
The following sections, Parts II.A.1.b–c, provide an explanation of the 
statutory requirements of the FAA and what obligations the United States 
has under the New York Convention. 
b.  Statutory Requirements for Enforcement of Mandatory Arbitration 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act 
Chapter Two of the FAA170 provides that “[t]he Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, 
shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this 
chapter.”171  In § 202, the FAA provides that “[a]n arbitration agreement 
. . . arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not . . . falls 
under the Convention” unless the relationship has no connection with 
foreign citizens or states (e.g., the relationship is completely between 
United States citizens or involves no property outside the United States).172  
Finally, § 206 provides that “[a] court . . . may direct that arbitration be held 
in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether 
that place is within or without the United States.”173 
 
 166. See id. But see Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 
587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Clement, J., concurring) (“I would hold that the 
relevant treaty provision, Article II of the Convention, is self-executing.”). 
 167. Aksen, supra note 161, at 15.  The treaty was presented on April 24, 1968 and the 
Senate gave advice and consent on October 4, 1968. Id. at 15–16; see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-
1181, at 2–3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3601–02. 
 168. Aksen, supra note 161, at 15. 
 169. An Act To Implement the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards ch. 2, 84 Stat at 692. 
 170. Chapter Two is titled the “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.” 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  The provisions relevant to enforcement of 
arbitration agreements include § 202 and § 206. Id. §§ 202, 206. 
 171. Id. § 201.  The effective date of the act was the date of “entry into force of the New 
York Convention with respect to the United States.” See An Act To Implement the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards § 208. 
 172. 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 173. Id. § 206.  The language directing that arbitration may be in or outside the United 
States is not explicitly required by the language or requirements of the New York 
Convention. See infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text.  For an argument that going 
beyond the requirements of the New York Convention is an indication of a policy favoring 
international arbitration for international trade disputes, see Gerald Aksen, The Application 
of the New York Convention by the United States Courts, in IV YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 341, 348 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1979). 
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c.  Arbitration Agreements Under the New York Convention 
Article II of the New York Convention contains the treaty language 
related to enforcement of arbitration agreements.  It provides that written 
arbitration agreements are to be recognized and enforced by nations who 
are parties to the Convention, subject to some conditions and exceptions.174  
In addition, the United States entered a “Reservation, Understanding, or 
Declaration”175 that altered its treaty obligation, such that the United States 
is obligated to “apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal 
relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered commercial 
under the national law.”176  The following paragraphs explain how courts 
comply with the treaty requirements related to enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and the conditions and limitations of their application. 
In order to comply with Article II of the New York Convention, courts 
can “compel arbitration.”177  This phrase does not appear in the New York 
Convention, but refers to the mandatory requirement that court proceedings 
brought in violation of an arbitration agreement be stayed178 in order to 
allow arbitration to be determinative.179  The New York Convention uses 
the word “shall,”180 which establishes the mandatory nature of the 
provision.181  Additionally, the phrase “refer the parties to arbitration”182 is 
 
 174. New York Convention, supra note 160, at art. II(3). 
 175. A RUD is the term that describes the United States’ entry of a reservation, 
understanding, or declaration to a treaty, and is the acronym for those three devices. See 
generally HENKIN, supra note 70, at 180–84.  Countries enter RUDs in order to change the 
treaty obligations they are entering into (a reservation), explain their understanding of the 
obligation they are entering into (an understanding), or make some other information known 
(a declaration). See id. at 180–84, 452–53 n.29; Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n to the Gen. 
Assembly, 50th Sess., April 20–June 12, July 27–Aug 14, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/53/10; GAOR, 
53d Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1998) reprinted in [1998] II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90–108, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1998/Add.1 (Part 2) (discussing the meaning and use of reservations 
under the VCLT and distinguishing declarations of understandings). 
 176. Convention Status, supra note 163.  The United States also entered a RUD that it 
would only enforce awards under the Convention made in a member state’s territory. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 
F.3d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“The Convention contemplates enforcement . . . 
directing that courts ‘shall’ compel arbitration.” (quoting New York Convention, supra note 
160, at art. II(3))); Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat’l Oil Co. (Pemex), 767 
F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 
Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2006).  The phrase appears in the title of § 206 
of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2006). 
 178. A stay is “[t]he postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or the like.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 54, at 1548. 
 179. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 
1958:  TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 128–31 (1981). 
 180. New York Convention, supra note 160, at art. II(3) (“The court of a Contracting 
State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an 
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer 
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative 
or incapable of being performed.”). 
 181. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719; Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 
2003) (“[E]nforcing arbitration clauses under the New York Convention is an obligation, not 
a matter committed to district court discretion.”); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat 
S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974) (“There is nothing discretionary about article 
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interpreted to mean a court order to stay the proceedings, or in American 
usage, an order to compel arbitration.183 
The New York Convention provides a few exceptions to the requirement 
of enforcing an arbitration agreement.184  The exceptions include 
agreements not within the meaning of Article II and agreements that are 
“null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”185  The Fifth 
Circuit noted that none of these exceptions were applicable in Safety 
National,186 but because some of these exceptions could resolve the conflict 
between the Convention and state law, a brief explanation follows. 
For the agreement to be within the meaning of Article II, it must meet 
three conditions of Article II(1)187:  (1) the agreement must be in writing, 
(2) there must be a dispute to be decided that arose from a defined legal 
relationship, and (3) the subject matter of the agreement must be capable of 
settlement by arbitration.188  This last requirement has been interpreted by 
the Second Circuit as a “certain categor[y] of claims [that] may be non-
arbitrable because of the special national interest vested in their [judicial, 
rather than arbitral,] resolution.”189  At least one commentator has made the 
argument that insurance is one such interest.190  In the past, “[c]lassic 
examples of non-arbitrable subject matters” were considered to include 
 
II(3) of the Convention.  It states that district courts shall at the request of a party to an 
arbitration agreement refer the parties to arbitration.”); VAN DEN BERG, supra note 179, at 
135 (“The mandatory character of the referral by a court to arbitration . . . is an 
internationally uniform rule.”). 
 182. New York Convention, supra note 160, at art. II(3). 
 183. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 179, at 129–31.  “Refer to arbitration” does not mean 
that a court order is required in order for arbitration to proceed. Id. at 129. 
 184. See generally id. at 144–61. 
 185. New York Convention, supra note 160, at art. II(3).  For the full text of Article II(3), 
see supra note 180. 
 186. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719. 
 187. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 179, at 144–45. 
 188. New York Convention, supra note 160, at art. II(1) (“Each Contracting State shall 
recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration 
all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration.”); see also id. at art. II(2) (“The term ‘agreement in writing’ shall 
include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or 
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”). 
 189. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du Papier 
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974); cf. Kathleen B. Carr, The Enforceability of 
Arbitration Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts:  The Conflict Between the Arbitration 
Convention and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 18 TUL. MAR. L.J. 71, 86 (1993) (arguing that 
“[a] proper construction of the Arbitration Convention should render it inapplicable 
according to its own terms” where state laws prohibit arbitration agreements in marine 
insurance contracts). 
 190. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 189, at 86. But see Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, 
The Remaining Hostility Towards Arbitration Shielded by the McCarran-Ferguson Act:  
How Far Should the Protection to Policyholders Go?, 1 U.P.R. BUS. L.J. 35, 42–45, 61 
(2010) (discussing limits of insurance-based arguments for anti-arbitration laws and arguing 
that a strong national policy in favor of arbitration makes precluding arbitration in insurance 
contracts an “extreme measure”). 
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“anti-trust, the validity of intellectual property rights . . . , family law[,] and 
the protection of certain weaker parties.”191 
In the United States, because the application of the treaty applies only to 
disputes arising from a commercial relationship, categories falling outside a 
commercial relationship, like family law, pose no concern.192  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has upheld arbitration of anti-trust claims.193  Finally, 
the Supreme Court has recognized a strong national policy in favor of 
enforcing arbitration for international commercial agreements that pre-dated 
United States ascension to the New York Convention, and this interest often 
wins out in the context of an international commercial contract.194 
After the exception for agreements not within the meaning of Article II, 
the next category of exceptions is for agreements that are “null and void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed.”195  Null and void can be 
interpreted to refer to situations where the arbitral clause itself is invalid, for 
example if the agreement was subject to “misrepresentation, duress, fraud 
or undue influence.”196  An arbitration agreement is inoperative when it 
ceases to have effect, for example if the parties have revoked the agreement 
or the same dispute has already been settled or decided in arbitration or in 
litigation.197  Finally, an arbitration agreement may be incapable of being 
performed if an effective implementation of the agreement is not possible, 
for example if its language is too unclear.198  Another example comes from 
Corcoran v. Ardra Insurance Co.199  In Corcoran, the New York State 
Court of Appeals held that an arbitration agreement was incapable of being 
performed because New York law only empowered the Superintendent of 
Insurance to litigate, and not to arbitrate, on behalf of an insolvent insurance 
company.200 
To summarize, Chapter Two of the FAA enforces the New York 
Convention requirements entered into by the United States, including 
mandatory enforcement of arbitration agreements for commercial 
relationships.201  Thus, to the extent that a state law prohibits the 
enforcement of mandatory arbitration of commercial disputes arising out of 
a legally defined relationship, the state law conflicts with both the FAA and 
 
 191. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 179, at 369; see also Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. 
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968) (recognizing “the conflict between federal 
statutory protection of a large segment of the public, frequently in an inferior bargaining 
position, and encouragement of arbitration as a ‘prompt, economical and adequate solution 
of controversies’” (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953))). 
 192. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text. 
 193. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628–
29 (1985). 
 194. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515–20 (1974). 
 195. New York Convention, supra note 160, at art. II(3).  For the full text of Article II(3), 
see supra note 180. 
 196. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 179, at 156. 
 197. Id. at 158. 
 198. Id. at 159. 
 199. 567 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 1990). 
 200. Id. at 232, 234. 
 201. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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the New York Convention.202  The next section deals with the requirements 
of the MFA. 
2.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
a.  Passage and Rationale of the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
In 1945, Congress passed the MFA in response to the Supreme Court’s 
1944 decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n.203  In 
South-Eastern Underwriters, the Court overruled prior precedent dating 
from 1869204 that had excluded insurance from interstate commerce.205  In 
addition to holding that Congress’s Commerce Clause powers extended to 
the business of insurance, the Court also found that the Sherman Act 
applied to the insurance industry.206  This was considered an unanticipated 
and unintended consequence of the Sherman Act,207 and there was concern 
that “other generally phrased congressional statutes might also apply to the 
issuance of insurance policies, thereby interfering with state regulation of 
insurance in similarly unanticipated ways.”208  To protect against this 
possibility, Congress enacted the MFA.209 
b.  Statutory Requirements for Reverse Preemption Under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act 
The MFA allows state laws enacted “for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance” to reverse the preemption of congressional acts that 
do not specifically “relate[] to the business of insurance.”210  This reflects a 
policy decision that it is in the public interest for states to have a broad 
grant of authority over the business of insurance.211  This was achieved in 
two ways.212 
 
 202. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 203. 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 
33 (1945), as recognized in Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 40 (1996). 
 204. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (“Issuing a policy of 
insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”), abrogated by South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S. 533.  Congress may only pass laws that fall expressly within one of its powers 
enumerated in the United States Constitution, which includes regulating interstate 
commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also supra note 54. 
 205. See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 534, 543–44 & n.18, 553 (overruling, 
explaining, and providing cases that relied on Paul); see also Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 
U.S. 299, 306 (1999) (recognizing that South-Eastern Underwriters overruled Paul). 
 206. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 553 (“A general application of the 
[Sherman] Act to all combinations of business and capital organized to suppress commercial 
competition is in harmony with the spirit and impulses of the times which gave it birth.”). 
 207. See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 40 (explaining that the application of antitrust 
regulation to the insurance industry was an unintended consequence). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  In particular, federal antitrust regulation was “widely perceived as a threat to 
state power to tax and regulate the insurance industry.” U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 
U.S. 491, 499–500 (1993). 
 210. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). 
 211. Id. § 1011; see also Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505 (“[The McCarran-Ferguson Act] was 
intended to further Congress’[s] primary objective of granting the States broad regulatory 
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First, Congress made clear that state law will govern the business of 
insurance.213  Second, Congress removed any “‘obstructions’” to state law 
enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance “‘which 
might be thought to flow from [Congress’s] own power, whether dormant 
or exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in 
future legislation.’”214 
c.  State Laws Enacted for the Purpose of Regulating the Business of 
Insurance 
Given the purpose of the MFA, a primary inquiry in determining whether 
it applies to a state law is whether the law was enacted “for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance.”215  Courts often examine whether the 
practice is part of the business of insurance,216 using for example a three 
factor test recognized in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno.217  This 
 
authority over the business of insurance.”); id. at 500 (“Shortly after passage of the 
[McCarran-Ferguson] Act, the Court observed:  ‘Obviously Congress’[s] purpose was 
broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the 
business of insurance.’” (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 
(1946))). 
 212. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500. 
 213. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (“The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, 
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of 
such business.”). 
 214. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 500 (alteration in original) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co., 328 U.S. 
at 429–30); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating 
the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of 
insurance:  Provided, That . . . the Sherman Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of 
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.”).  The Supreme 
Court has explained that “the second clause [of § 1012(b)] exempts only ‘the business of 
insurance’ itself from the antitrust laws” whereas the first clause “is not so narrowly 
circumscribed.” Fabe, 508 U.S. at 504; see also id. at 504 n.6. 
 215. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).  If the state law would conflict with the federal law and the 
federal law is determined not to “specifically relate to the business of insurance,” then the 
primary inquiry is whether the state “statute is a law enacted ‘for the purpose of regulating 
the business of insurance.’” Fabe, 508 U.S. at 501; see also id. at 504 (explaining that when 
determining if a law was “‘enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance’ . . . [w]e deal . . . with the first clause” of § 1012(b) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1012(b))). 
 216. See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 502–04; Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 
1995) (using the Pireno test in the context of the first clause of the MFA while recognizing 
the test originated within the context of the second clause); Susan Randall, Mandatory 
Arbitration in Insurance Disputes:  Inverse Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 
CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 265–69 (2005). 
 217. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).  The three factors include:  
“first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; 
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer 
and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance 
industry.” Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.  For an example of the use of the Pireno test to establish 
the central inquiry of the relationship between the insurer and insured, see Stephens, 66 F.3d 
at 44–45 and infra notes 302–06 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court also 
established a two factor test—representing a “a clean break” from the McCarran-Ferguson 
factors—for determining the meaning of regulating insurance under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which does not preempt state laws 
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test was originally used to determine whether a practice is part of the 
business of insurance and thus exempt from antitrust regulation under the 
second clause of § 1012(b) of the MFA.218  However, to determine whether 
state law may reverse preempt federal law, under the first clause of the 
MFA, the true inquiry hinges on the state enactment’s purpose of regulating 
the business of insurance.219 
Laws enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance 
“possess the ‘end, intention, or aim’ of adjusting, managing, or controlling 
the business of insurance.”220  To determine this, most courts, based on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,221 focus on 
whether the statute is aimed at the relationship between the insurer and the 
insured.222 
To summarize, the New York Convention and the FAA thus appear to 
conflict with the MFA.  The former requires courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements in commercial contracts,223 while the latter commands them to 
refuse to do so if compelled by state law.224  When faced with this potential 
conflict, the courts first examine whether the laws are “capable of co-
existence” before determining which law prevails.225 
 
regulating insurance. See Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 333, 341–
42 (2003). 
 218. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129. 
 219. See Fabe, 508 U.S. at 504 (“To equate laws ‘enacted . . . for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance’ with the ‘business of insurance’ itself . . . would be to 
read words out of the statute.  This we refuse to do.”); see also supra note 215 and 
accompanying text. 
 220. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (6th ed. 1990)). 
 221. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). 
 222. Id. at 460 (“[W]hatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the 
focus was—it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder.  
Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws 
regulating the ‘business of insurance.’”); see, e.g., Autry v. Nw. Premium Servs., 144 F.3d 
1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting National Securities, Inc., at 460; Fabe, 508 U.S. at 505); 
Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 593–94 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Nat’l Secs., Inc., 393 U.S. at 460); Hudson v. Supreme Enters., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-795, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58280, at *12-14 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2007); Nat’l Home Ins. Co. v. King, 
291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 529 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (“[T]he Kentucky legislature has enacted a statute 
that is directed specifically at the relationship between the insurer and insured with the aim 
of protecting policyholders from mandatory arbitration agreements reached in the context of 
an adhesion contract.”); Kachanis v. United States, 844 F. Supp. 877, 881–82 (D.R.I. 1994); 
Ambrose v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 891 F. Supp. 1153, 1162–63 (E.D. Va. 1995); see 
also Randall, supra note 216, at 265 n.49 (explaining the rationale of Nat’l Homes Ins. Co.); 
id. at 263 (“Insurance companies, as repeat players unencumbered by precedent or estoppel, 
may take varying positions on the same policy provision in successive arbitrations, or 
continue to advance an oft-rejected interpretation.”). 
 223. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 224. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 225. This is the general rule governing conflicts between any sources of law, for example 
between two statutes, a statute and a treaty, or a statute and customary international law. See 
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995) (“‘[W]hen 
two statutes are capable of co-existence . . . it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly 
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.’” (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))); Pittsburgh & 
Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Ry. Labor Execs’ Assn., 491 U.S. 490, 510 (1989))); Whitney v. 
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The next two sections show courts performing precisely this form of 
analysis, but coming to opposite results, given the conflicting obligations of 
the New York Convention, the FAA, and the MFA.  Part II.B addresses the 
Fifth Circuit’s wrestling with this question in Safety National, while Part 
II.C describes the Second Circuit’s position in Stephens.  The discussion 
focuses on the courts’ analysis of whether the New York Convention has 
Supremacy Clause effect, independent of its implementing legislation, but 
each part first addresses why the MFA is applicable in each case, thereby 
overturning the Supremacy Clause effect of the FAA.  This leads to the 
main issue of whether an implemented non-self-executing treaty can 
independently preempt a state law. 
B.  The Fifth Circuit Distinguishes Implemented Treaties:  Safety National 
Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
In 2009, sitting en banc,226 the Fifth Circuit Safety National majority held 
that “implemented treaty provisions, self-executing or not, are not reverse-
preempted by state law pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”227  Safety 
National involved a reinsurance dispute between the Louisiana Safety 
Association of Timbermen—Self Insurance Fund (LSAT),228 underwriters 
at Lloyd’s, London (the Underwriters), and Safety National Casualty 
 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same 
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. . . . When the two relate to 
the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to 
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either . . . .”); Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (establishing the Charming Betsy Rule 
that U.S. statutes are generally interpreted to be consistent with international law absent clear 
contrary congressional intent because “an act of congress ought never to be construed to 
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains”). 
 226. The case was heard by all seventeen then-active circuit judges and one judge with 
senior status. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 
F.3d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (listing the judges).  The majority consisted of 
fourteen judges, while one judge concurred in the opinion and three judges dissented. See id. 
at 717.  The concurring judge argued that the text of Article II of the New York Convention 
indicated that it was self-executing and therefore preempts the Louisiana Insurance Code. Id. 
at 733–35 (Clement, J., concurring); see also id. at 736 (arguing that only some parts of the 
Convention were non-self-executing, such as enforcement of foreign arbitral decisions).  
However, this contradicts the understanding at the time of ratification that implementing 
legislation would be needed for enforcement of both arbitral agreements and decisions. See 
supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 227. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 731.  One student commentator has argued that arbitration 
agreements in international reinsurance contracts should be enforced against conflicting state 
law, notwithstanding the MFA. See generally J. Logan Murphy, Note, Law Triangle:  
Arbitrating International Reinsurance Disputes Under the New York Convention, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and Antagonistic State Law, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1535 
(2008) (arguing that arbitration agreements should be enforced under traditional rules of 
international law and Supreme Court precedent favoring enforcement of international 
arbitration agreements). 
 228. Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen—Self Insurers Fund (LSAT) operates 
in Louisiana and provides members with workers’ compensation insurance. Safety Nat’l, 587 
F.3d at 717. 
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Corporation (Safety National).229  LSAT and the Underwriters entered 
reinsurance agreements that contained arbitration provisions.230  The 
Underwriters sought to compel arbitration, and LSAT sought to quash 
arbitration by arguing that the Louisiana Insurance Code voided arbitration 
agreements.231 
The Louisiana Insurance Code voids language in insurance contracts 
(subject to the State of Louisiana’s laws) that would deprive Louisiana 
courts of jurisdiction over cases brought against insurers.232  Louisiana 
courts have held that arbitration agreements in insurance contracts are 
voided and unenforceable under the Louisiana Insurance Code.233  In 
support of this conclusion, the Safety National petitioners have argued that 
“[t]he Louisiana arbitration statute is designed to force insurers to handle 
claims of Louisiana residents in good faith by subjecting them to jury trials 
in local state courts if they refuse to pay covered claims.”234  The Fifth 
Circuit assumed without deciding that section 868 of the Louisiana 
Insurance Code regulates the business of insurance within the meaning of 
the MFA,235 but noted three reasons for uncertainty prior to turning to 
whether the New York Convention was reverse preempted.236  First, an 
argument could be made that “one of the criteria for determining whether a 
law regulates the business of insurance is whether it has the effect of 
spreading or transferring a policyholder’s risk,” and anti-arbitration 
provisions do not have this effect.237  Second, an argument could be made 
that because arbitration is a question of forum selection and does not 
implicate the substantive rights of the parties, anti-arbitration provisions 
may not be considered to be enacted for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance, but rather “‘for the parochial purpose of regulating a 
foreign insurer’s choice of forum.’”238  Third, an argument could be made 
that prohibiting arbitration does not fulfill the necessary requirement of 
protecting policy holders.239  After noting these uncertainties, the majority 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  The dispute related in part to the validity of an assignment LSAT had made, 
transferring LSAT’s rights under the reinsurance agreements with Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, London to Safety National Casualty Corporation. Id. 
 231. Id.  As explained previously, if a state law satisfies the MFA, then state law applies 
rather than a conflicting federal statute. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 232. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868(C) (Supp. 2011). 
 233. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719 n.11. 
 234. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen—Self Insurers Fund 
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 130 S. Ct. 3311 (2010) (No. 09-945), 2010 WL 
1602098 at *12. 
 235. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 720–21. 
 236. See id. at 720–21 & n.21.  For an argument that arbitration agreements do not 
regulate the business of insurance, see Hernández-Gutiérrez, supra note 190, at 42–45. 
 237. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 720 n.21 (citing Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 
458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)). 
 238. Id. (quoting Int’l Ins. Co. v. Duryee, 96 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1996)); Duryee, 96 
F.3d at 839 (noting that while preserving litigation may be a valid concern, choice of forum 
between courts is not). 
 239. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 721 n.21. 
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then turned to their argument that the MFA did not cause state law to 
reverse preempt the New York Convention. 
To reach its conclusion, the majority essentially relied on the following 
line of reasoning.240  First, it “construed” an implemented non-self-
executing treaty as the source of federal law in conflict with state law.241  
Next, it held that a treaty, “self-executing or not,” is not an “Act of 
Congress” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.242  Thus, the 
court concluded that “the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s provision that ‘no Act 
of Congress’ shall be construed to supersede state law regulating the 
business of insurance is inapplicable.”243 
a.  The New York Convention as the Source of Law 
The court explained multiple times that it was construing the New York 
Convention, and not the FAA, to establish the parties’ rights and 
obligations.244  LSAT had argued that an implemented non-self-executing 
treaty “has no effect independent of [the] legislation enabling it,” and 
therefore only the FAA was relevant.245  The court rejected this argument 
for several reasons. 
First, the court reasoned that a treaty was a distinct entity that remained 
in place as an “international agreement or contract negotiated by the 
Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate, not by Congress.”246  The 
treaty did not cease to matter because Congress passed an act to implement 
it.247  Therefore, “[i]mplementing legislation that does not conflict with or 
override a treaty does not replace or displace that treaty.”248 
 
 240. The opinion did not follow this order, and instead was primarily framed in terms of 
the meaning of “Act of Congress” and “Treaty.” See, e.g., Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 731 
(“Because we give the phrases ‘Act of Congress’ and ‘such Act’ their usual, commonly 
understood meaning, we conclude that implemented treaty provisions, self-executing or not, 
are not reverse-preempted by state law pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.” (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006))).  However, because the heart of the analysis depends on the court 
finding that the treaty can serve as an independent source of law, the next section begins 
with this analysis before moving to the meaning of “Act of Congress.” 
 241. Id. at 718 (“[I]t is when we construe a treaty . . . to determine the parties’ respective 
rights and obligations, that the state law at issue is superseded.”); id. at 724 (“Equally 
important in the present case, it is a treaty (the Convention) . . . that we construe to supersede 
Louisiana law.”); id. at 725 (“[W]hen we ‘construe’ the Convention, we are faced with the 
possibility of ‘superseding’ the Louisiana law.”); id. (“[I]t is by reference to the Convention 
that . . . we ‘supersede’ Louisiana law . . . .”). 
 242. Id. at 718 (“Congress did not intend to include a treaty within the scope of an ‘Act of 
Congress’ when it used those words in the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . .”); id. at 723 (“The 
fact that a treaty is implemented by Congress does not mean that it ceases to be a treaty and 
becomes an ‘Act of Congress.’”). 
 243. Id. at 725. 
 244. See supra note 241. 
 245. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 721. 
 246. Id. at 723. 
 247. See id.  In support of this reasoning, the court cited cases that stood for the 
proposition that treaties and statutes have equal stature under the Constitution, and if there is 
a conflict then the one last in time prevails. See id. at 722–23 n.32 (quoting Egle v. Egle, 715 
F.2d 999, 1013 (5th Cir. 1983)) (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509 n.5 (2008); 
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam)); see also Egle, 715 F.2d at 1013 
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Second, the court concluded that the implementing legislation indicates 
that Congress thought the treaty has a separate status independent from its 
implementing legislation.249  The court pointed to the fact that § 203 of the 
FAA, dealing with jurisdiction and amount in controversy, states that “[a]n 
action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise 
under the laws and treaties of the United States.”250  Thus, “Congress 
recognized that jurisdiction over actions to enforce rights under the 
Convention” could arise from the Convention itself.251 
Third, the court similarly reasoned that the FAA depends on the New 
York Convention for its operation.  In support of this, the court explained: 
It is the Convention under which legal agreements “fall”; it is an action or 
proceeding under the Convention that provides the court with jurisdiction; 
such an action or proceeding is “deemed to arise under the laws and 
treaties” of the United States, the treaty in this case being the Convention; 
and when chapter 1 of title 9 (the FAA) conflicts with the Convention, the 
Convention applies.252 
Therefore, because Congress (through the FAA) directed courts to the 
treaty, there was no congressionally created bar to construing the treaty as 
the source of law, and it was appropriate to do so.253 
Finally, the Court turned more directly to the issue of what preemptive 
power an implemented non-self-executing treaty could have under the 
Supremacy Clause.254  Although the result could be interpreted as an 
implicit finding that a non-self-executing treaty, once implemented, is the 
“supreme Law of the Land” just as a self-executing treaty is, the court 
denied making this finding, stating: 
[W]e need not and do not undertake to determine the precise or technical 
contours of how or whether implemented non-self-executing treaty 
provisions become the “Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause.  
Our task in the present case is to determine if, in enacting the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, Congress intended for state law to reverse-preempt federal 
law that has as its source an implemented non-self-executing treaty.255 
Nevertheless, the court presented several arguments in opposition to the 
dissent’s contention that an “implemented non-self-executing treaty is not a 
 
(“Under our Constitution, treaties and statutes are equal in dignity.” (quoting Whitney v. 
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888))).  The court also quoted Percheman in support of the 
proposition that when interpreting acts of Congress related to the subject of a treaty, the 
treaty should be taken into account. See id. at 723 n.33 (quoting United States v. Percheman, 
32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833)). 
 248. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722–23. 
 249. Id. at 724. 
 250. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2006); Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724. 
 251. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724. 
 252. Id. at 724–25 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 202–03, 205, 208 (2006)). 
 253. See id. at 725 (“The Convention Act directs us to the treaty it implemented, and 
when we ‘construe’ the Convention, we are faced with the possibility of ‘superseding’ the 
Louisiana law.”). 
 254. See id. at 725–30. 
 255. Id. at 727. 
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treaty within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause and cannot preempt 
state law.”256 
First, the court outright denied that there was precedent supporting the 
idea that an implemented non-self-executing treaty did not fall within the 
Supremacy Clause.257  The court explained that while Supreme Court 
precedent established that a non-implemented non-self-executing treaty 
could not be judicially enforced and could not supersede statute, the cases 
establishing this did not consider whether this would be true for an 
implemented non-self-executing treaty.258  On the other hand, the court 
reasoned that the Fifth Circuit “ha[d] exhibited an understanding that 
implemented provisions of a non-self-executing treaty can themselves be 
given effect by the courts as federal law.”259  Additionally, the court 
interpreted statements in Medellin as supporting the “commonly-held 
conception that a treaty provision can itself become domestic law once 
implemented.”260 
The court also cited Missouri v. Holland in support of its position that 
Congress did not intend “for state law to reverse-preempt federal law that 
has as its source an implemented non-self-executing treaty.”261  The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that in Holland “[t]he validity of the implementing 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause turned on the 
constitutionality of the treaty—even though it was implemented by an Act 
of Congress.”262  Therefore, an implemented non-self-executing treaty 
remains distinct from and should be “viewed as distinct from an Act of 
Congress.”263  Further, the court explained Holland as standing for the idea 
that it was the implemented non-self-executing treaty that was binding on 
the states as well as a source of authority for Congress to pass the 
legislation.264  The Fifth Circuit concluded that Holland was decided in 
 
 256. Id. at 725. 
 257. Id. at 725–27. 
 258. Id. at 725 n.47. 
 259. Id. at 727; see also id. at 727 n.54 (citing cases where the Fifth Circuit used language 
indicating that an implemented treaty was applicable as federal law or “becomes the supreme 
law of the land”). 
 260. Id. at 727 n.56.  For example, the court quoted as evidence, “[i]n sum, while treaties 
‘may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has 
either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-
executing’ and is ratified on these terms.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008)). 
 261. Id. at 727–28.  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), held that Congress could 
pass a law that would otherwise be outside of its enumerated powers under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, in order to implement a treaty. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 262. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 728. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. (“The Court assumed that ‘but for the treaty the State would be free to 
regulate [migratory birds within its boundaries] itself.’ But the Court explained, ‘[v]alid 
treaties of course are as binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are 
elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United States.’ The Court continued, ‘[n]o doubt 
the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty 
may override its power.’ Because the treaty was constitutional, the Supreme Court ultimately 
concluded ‘that the treaty and statute must be upheld.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Holland, 252 U.S. at 434–35)). 
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1920, and therefore “when Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act . . . it was well aware that a treaty, even if requiring implementation, 
was distinct from an Act of Congress and could serve as the source of 
authority to ‘override [a state’s] power.’”265 
b.  Treaties Are Not Acts of Congress 
Having explained the court’s rationale for why the treaty could be 
construed as the source of law, this section deals with the court’s analysis of 
why the treaty was not an “Act of Congress” within the meaning of the 
MFA.  The court focused on Congress’s intention with regard to the MFA 
and the use of the phrase “Act of Congress.”266  The court reasoned that 
whether the treaty was self-executing267 was irrelevant because Congress 
did not intend to include any type of treaty within the meaning of an “Act of 
Congress.”268 
LSAT had conceded that if the New York Convention were self-
executing, then it would not be “an ‘Act of Congress’ within the meaning of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”269  LSAT, however, maintained that the New 
York Convention could not supersede state law.270  Having rejected 
LSAT’s argument that an implemented non-self-executing treaty “has no 
effect independent of [the] legislation enabling it,”271 the court analyzed 
whether the New York Convention could be reverse preempted because it 
was an “Act of Congress.”272 
The court found that this would lead to the “untenable” conclusion that 
Congress meant to exclude one type of implemented treaty273 from the 
meaning of “Act of Congress” but not another type of implemented 
treaty.274  The court reasoned that “[i]n other federal statutes that are 
currently in effect, it does not appear that Congress has used the term 
‘treaty’ to exclude implemented non-self-executing treaties.”275  
Additionally, the same reasoning that supported the court’s conclusion that 
the treaty could serve as the source of law to supersede state law also 
 
 265. Id. at 728–29 (alteration in original) (quoting Holland, 252 U.S. at 434). 
 266. See, e.g., id. at 723–24. 
 267. The majority could not determine if Article II of the treaty was self-executing, even 
though it attempted to apply the reasoning of Medellin. See id. at 721–22 (“It is unclear to us 
whether the Convention is self-executing.”). 
 268. Id. at 722–23. 
 269. Id. at 721. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 722–23. 
 273. Id. at 723.  In other words, the court conceived of a self-executing treaty as one type 
of implemented treaty. See id. at 723 n.35 (“It would seem that ‘treaty’ would include all 
implemented treaties, regardless of whether they were self-executing or had required 
implementing legislation.”). 
 274. Id. at 723–24. 
 275. Id. at 723 n.35. 
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supported the argument that a treaty is distinct from an “Act of 
Congress.”276  The next section explains the opposing viewpoint. 
2.  The Dissent 
In Safety National, Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod, writing for the dissent, 
argued that non-self-executing treaties, whether implemented or not, 
“cannot . . . provide a rule of decision” in U.S. courts.277  The dissent took 
the view that a non-self-executing treaty cannot be “promoted to the 
Supremacy Clause status it would have enjoyed had it been self-
executing.”278  The dissent reasoned that a non-self-executing treaty, like “a 
model code, [is only] a source of content,” and thus “remains as inert.”279 
In support of this conclusion, the dissent argued that the majority opinion 
went against the prevailing interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
on treaty execution,280 failed to support its views with case law,281 and 
ignored the consensus of legal scholars.282  In short, the dissent argued that 
the majority, without any proper basis, created “a doctrinal novelty” in 
order to conclude that the New York Convention could be construed as the 
source of federal law superseding state law.283  Following is an explanation 
of the dissent’s reasoning for each argument. 
The dissent’s first argument was that there are two kinds of treaties and 
only one of them can ever be directly enforced in the courts.284  The dissent 
argued that the “Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that only self-
executing treaties operate by their own force to provide a rule of decision in 
the courts.”285  The dissent relied on language from Whitney v. 
Robertson,286 the Head-Money Cases287 and Medellin to distinguish the two 
types of treaties288 and reasoned that because the Supreme Court has 
 
 276. Id. at 723 (“The fact that a treaty is implemented by Congress does not mean that it 
ceases to be a treaty and becomes an ‘Act of Congress.’”); id. at 724 (“Our conclusion that 
Congress did not intend the term ‘Act of Congress,’ as used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
to reach a treaty such as the Convention is buttressed by the terms of the Convention Act.”); 
see also supra notes 249–253, 263 and accompanying text. 
 277. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 737 (Elrod, J., dissenting).  Judges E. Smith and Emilio M. 
Garza joined in the dissent. 
 278. Id. at 740. 
 279. Id. at 740 & n.13 (describing a model code as a source of content incorporated by 
reference, but also conceding that “as a matter of international law, the United States is 
bound by its commitments, including those arising from non-self-executing treaties”). 
 280. See id. at 739–40. 
 281. Id. at 740 (“The court points to no case holding that a non-self-executing treaty can 
supersede state law.”). 
 282. Id. at 741 (“The court also ignores the consensus of legal scholars regarding the 
Supremacy Clause status of implemented treaties.”). 
 283. Id. at 738. 
 284. See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 285. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 739 (emphasis added) (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491 (2008); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 315 (1829)). 
 286. 124 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 287. 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 288. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 739–40 (quoting Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505; Whitney, 124 
U.S. at 194; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598). 
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consistently made the distinction, “treaties come in two separate and 
distinct types:  self-executing treaties, which can undoubtedly preempt state 
law in a case like this, and non-self-executing treaties, which cannot.”289 
Next, the dissent argued that the majority’s opinion failed to find and 
discuss supporting case law.290  The dissent explained that there was no 
case law that could support the majority’s position,291 and that the 
majority’s Holland analysis failed to provide “support [for] the conclusion 
that implementation by statute imbues a non-self-executing treaty with 
preemptive abilities . . . .”292  In addition, the dissent noted that the 
majority’s holding conflicts with the Second Circuit’s position in 
Stephens.293 
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority had ignored the consensus of 
legal scholars because “commentators overwhelmingly conclude that under 
current (and longstanding) law, it is only the implementing statute, not the 
non-self-executing treaty, that can be enforced by the courts so as to be 
capable of preemption.”294  The dissent cited several sources for this 
proposition,295 including the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, which states, “strictly, it is the implementing 
legislation, rather than the agreement itself, that is given effect as law in the 
United States.”296  The next section explains the Second Circuit’s opinion 
in Stephens, which—like the Safety National dissenting opinion—
concluded that the New York Convention could not preempt state law. 
C.  The Second Circuit Finds Non-Self-Executing Treaties Inapplicable:  
Stephens v. American International Insurance Co. 
Stephens involved a dispute between the liquidator of an insolvent 
reinsurance company and companies that had ceded risk to the reinsurer but 
refused to pay premiums and other obligations allegedly owed.297  The 
 
 289. Id. at 740.  The dissent also noted that “[t]here is an argument, based on the text of 
the Supremacy Clause, that the Constitution should not recognize two species of treaty. . . . 
But this interpretation has not prevailed.” Id. at 739 n.10. 
 290. Id. at 741 (“Indeed, the court does not attempt to argue that Foster, Whitney, the 
Head-Money Cases, or Medellin, or any case interpreting any of them, supports the premise 
that the non-self-executing Convention is capable of ‘superceding’ state law under the 
Supremacy Clause.”). 
 291. Id. at 740.  The dissent quotes David Sloss’s statement that “to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, no U.S. court has ever held a treaty provision to be non-self-executing 
and then applied it directly to decide a case.” Id. (quoting David Sloss, The Domestication of 
International Human Rights:  Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 
24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 149 (1999)). 
 292. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 741. 
 293. Id. at 742–43; see supra Part II.C (discussing Stephens). 
 294. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 741. 
 295. Id. at 741–42. 
 296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 75, § 111(3) cmt. h. But see Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 726 (finding this 
unpersuasive because it lacks analysis, does not cite to authority, is of “recent vintage,” and 
because “[t]he Reporter for that [Restatement] was Professor Louis Henkin, arguably an 
advocate for the enforcement of implemented treaty provisions”). 
 297. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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companies “moved to compel arbitration.”298  At the time, the relevant state 
law, Kentucky Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Law299 (Kentucky 
Law), governed contractual agreements in delinquency proceedings and 
subordinated any conflicting provisions (including specifically arbitration 
agreements) to the Kentucky Law.300  Based on this, the liquidator argued 
that the arbitration agreements in question were voided by the Kentucky 
Law, because it (and not the FAA) was applicable under the MFA.301 
The Second Circuit held that under the three factor Pireno test,302 
reinsurance was part of the business of insurance and the Kentucky Law 
fulfilled the requirements of § 1012(b) of the MFA, because it had the aim 
of regulating and protecting the relationship between the policy holder and 
insurer.303  The court reached this conclusion on the rationale that the 
Kentucky Law was aimed at managing the performance of an insolvent 
insurer’s (or reinsurer’s) insurance contracts.304  The court held that “[i]t is 
crucial to the ‘relationship between [an] insurance company and [a] 
policyholder’ that both parties know that in the case of insolvency, the 
insurance company will be liquidated in an organized fashion,” and 
“‘protects’ policyholders by . . . assuring” this.305  Thus, on this argument 
the MFA would allow the Kentucky Law to reverse preempt the FAA.306 
The next question, then, is whether the New York Convention can itself 
have Supremacy Clause effect.  The Second Circuit took an opposing view 
from the Fifth Circuit, holding that the Supremacy Clause did not cause the 
New York Convention to preempt conflicting state law because the New 
York Convention “relies upon an Act of Congress for its 
implementation.”307  The court concluded that “[t]he [New York] 
Convention itself is simply inapplicable in this instance.”308 
The court did not offer an explanation for this position, other than to 
quote language from Foster that “[a] treaty is, in its nature, a contract . . . 
[and] when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty 
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the 
legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the 
court.”309 
 
 298. Id. at 43. 
 299. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33–010 (LEXIS through 1994 legislation). 
 300. See id. § 304.33–010(6); Stephens, 66 F.3d at 43. 
 301. Stephens, 66 F.3d at 43. 
 302. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 303. Stephens, 66 F.3d at 44–45. 
 304. Id. at 45. 
 305. Id. at 44–45 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 
U.S. 491, 493, 501 (1993)). 
 306. But cf. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 77 N.Y.2d 225 (1990) (holding that the New 
York Convention did not require enforcement of an arbitration clause where New York law 
did not empower the state Superintendent of Insurance, acting on behalf of an insolvent 
insurance company, to participate in arbitration.). 
 307. Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313–14 (1829)). 
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III.  TREATIES, WHETHER SELF-EXECUTING OR NOT, CAN HAVE 
INDEPENDENT SUPREMACY CLAUSE EFFECT 
Non-self-executing treaties achieve Supremacy Clause effect once 
implemented by legislation.  In some circumstances, this force of law is 
within the treaty itself and not just the implementing legislation.  This 
conclusion is supported by the history and purpose of including treaties 
within the Supremacy Clause, as well as the power structure set up by the 
Constitution, which gives the national government primary power over 
foreign policy and limits the actions of the states in this area.  The New 
York Convention is an example of such a treaty. 
This part first explains why the New York Convention should be held to 
have Supremacy Clause effect even though its implementing legislation 
may not.  Next, this part argues that the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit 
dissents were incorrect in their analysis of the Supremacy Clause status of 
non-self-executing treaties.  Finally, this part explains how courts should 
examine the Supremacy Clause effect of implemented treaties. 
A.  The Case of the New York Convention 
The New York Convention is an Article II treaty that received 
Supremacy Clause effect by enactment of a federal statute.310  The MFA is 
a statute that disables the Supremacy Clause effect of “Acts of 
Congress.”311  This means that the FAA, an “Act of Congress” not specific 
to insurance,312 cannot preempt state laws that satisfy the MFA 
requirements of being passed for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance.313  In other words, the existence of the FAA (a contrary federal 
statute) no longer binds judges to disregard state law.314  In this situation, 
the New York Convention should be found to have Supremacy Clause 
effect, although the FAA may not, because when both the MFA and the 
New York Convention by their terms apply, it creates a situation where 
national foreign policy interests outweigh state interests.  That is, the treaty 
should still bind state (and federal) judges to disregard conflicting state law 
in order to enforce foreign policy that has not been overridden by a “Law of 
the Land.” 
This argument is explained first by addressing whether anti-arbitration 
provisions within state insurance laws in fact fulfill the MFA, such that the 
Supremacy Clause effect of the FAA is disabled; second, by examining 
when the New York Convention might not apply; and third, by explaining 
the impact on foreign policy when both the MFA and the treaty apply. 
 
 310. See supra notes 67–70, 163–69 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra Part II.A.1.b–c. 
 313. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
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1.  State Anti-Arbitration Insurance Provisions Arguably Fulfill the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act Requirements 
First, state insurance laws that have anti-arbitration provisions can 
usually fulfill the MFA requirement allowing them to reverse preempt the 
FAA.  For example, although in Safety National the Fifth Circuit noted that 
it was not certain that the Louisiana Insurance Code satisfied the MFA 
requirements,315 it is likely that the purpose of the Code and others like it 
do in fact satisfy the MFA.  The Fifth Circuit’s reasons for uncertainty 
included:  anti-arbitration provisions do not spread or transfer risk; anti-
arbitration provisions do not act to protect policy holders; and arbitration is 
a form of forum selection that does not implicate substantive rights.316 
The first argument, related to risk spreading, relies on the first factor of a 
three factor test from the Pireno line of cases.317  However, this test was 
developed in the context of determining whether a practice is part of the 
business of insurance and thus exempt from antitrust regulation under the 
second clause of § 1012(b) of the MFA.318  In contrast, the primary inquiry 
for the first clause, the relevant clause here, revolves around the 
enactment’s purpose of regulating the business of insurance.319  
Determining whether a law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance is different from determining whether a practice is 
part of the business of insurance.320  In order to fail to satisfy the 
requirement of being enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance, the anti-arbitration provision also must not be aimed at 
regulating the relationship between the insurer and insured.321  Whether 
anti-arbitration provisions spread or transfer risk addresses only one factor 
in a narrower inquiry.322  Therefore, this factor cannot bear the weight 
required to find that the Louisiana Insurance Code does not satisfy the MFA 
requirements.323 
The Fifth Circuit’s next two arguments come closer to taking the state 
statute outside of the MFA requirements.  Courts have found, however, that 
anti-arbitration laws specific to insurance contracts are passed in order to 
protect insurance holders from unequal treatment by insurance carriers who 
can reach different results for the same policy provision when decisions are 
made in confidential arbitration proceedings.324  This resolves the argument 
regarding protection.  Additionally, this goes to the relationship between 
 
 315. See supra notes 235–39 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text. 
 324. See, e.g., supra note 222 (quoting Nat’l Home Ins. Co. v. King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 
529 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Randall, supra note 205, at 263) (citing Randall, supra note 205, at 
265 n.49).  The Safety National petitioners argued that forcing a jury trial had the effect of 
protecting policy holders. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. But cf. infra note 328. 
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insurer and insured, and thus weighs against an argument that the purpose is 
to regulate the forum selection choice of foreign insurers.325  On this basis, 
the MFA would allow a state law to reverse preempt the FAA. 
2.  The New York Convention Exception for Special National Interests 
Second, when state law satisfies the MFA, the FAA and the New York 
Convention will conflict with the state law unless the MFA’s policy giving 
states a broad grant of authority over the business of insurance326 pulls the 
arbitration agreement into the realm of non-arbitral subject matter because it 
is a special national interest.327  It could be the case that this New York 
Convention (and thus FAA) exception to enforcement applies to the type of 
policy concern the MFA arguably represents.  Namely, insurance regulation 
by the states aimed at regulating the relationship between the insurer and 
insured may be a subject matter best left to judicial rather than arbitral 
resolution.328  If this is so, and this interest trumps the national interest of 
having international arbitral resolution, then under the FAA itself the 
arbitration agreement would not need to be enforced because the subject 
matter of the agreement is not capable of settlement by arbitration.329 
3.  The New York Convention as the Embodiment of a Foreign Policy 
Decision Left Unaltered by Its Implementing Legislation 
Third, if the MFA does not represent a special enough national policy 
concern, then the conflict remains, and the MFA would negate the FAA’s 
Supremacy Clause effect.330  This would result in the violation of an 
international obligation due to state policy choices that are not even strong 
enough to trump the national policy interest in favor of settling international 
commercial disputes through arbitration.  If the treaty were not involved 
(imagine that Congress simply enacted the requirements of the Convention 
as the FAA but there is no treaty obligation), then no harm occurs when the 
state law preempts the FAA, even though the policy concerns of the FAA 
technically trump the MFA’s.  If Congress thought there were negative 
 
 325. See supra note 220–22 and accompanying text.  This legislation contrasts with laws 
that seek to dictate forum selection between state and federal courts, which could not be said 
to go to the relationship between insurer and insured. See supra note 238. 
 326. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text.  From a domestic policy 
perspective, the issue is the clash between two favored national policies:  state regulation of 
insurance, on the one hand, and the settlement of international commercial disputes through 
arbitration, on the other.  Arguing that the MFA should trump the FAA is analogous to 
arguing that the policy interest the MFA represents should trump the policy interest the FAA 
represents.  However, there is also foreign policy to consider, i.e., the treaty. 
 328. See supra note 186–89 and accompanying text.  The issue must be framed in terms 
of the relationship between the insurer and insured.  If the argument is that the state courts 
ought to be able to retain jurisdiction over disputes, this becomes a failed forum selection 
argument because then it does not even fall within the MFA protected interest. See, e.g., 
supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 210–22 and accompanying 
text. 
 329. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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implications, it could fix them with no other negative result.  But with a 
treaty, foreign policy decisions become unenforceable because the treaty is 
unenforceable against state action.  Thus, if the Supremacy Clause effect of 
the New York Convention does not survive the loss of the FAA, then the 
United States is in breach of its international obligations, arguably making 
it more difficult to enforce treaty benefits for American businesses 
contracting internationally.331  This is one precise purpose of the 
Supremacy Clause and a primary reason the Founders included treaties 
within the Supremacy Clause.332  Additionally, the Constitution gives 
foreign policy power to the national government,333 and in particular the 
relevant branches include the President and the Senate as creators of the 
Article II treaty.334 
The treaty, as a properly ratified Article II treaty made under the 
authority of the United States, embodies a foreign policy decision335 that 
neither the FAA nor the MFA purports to change.336  With regard to 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, key officials, including the President 
and Senate, thought it necessary to amend the FAA due to procedural 
difficulties and lack of precedent for compelling arbitration outside the 
United States.337  This corresponds to the category of treaties incapable or 
inappropriate for judicial action, because a political question blank needs to 
be fulfilled or, more likely, changes to current law would be appropriate to 
streamline enforcement.338  Because the implementing legislation in this 
case does not purport to change what the United States foreign 
policymakers determined was the United States policy, the treaty itself can 
and should have Supremacy Clause effect over state laws that would 
otherwise “impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”339  
The next section explains why the Second Circuit’s Stephens decision and 
the Fifth Circuit’s Safety National dissent were incorrect in their analysis of 
the status of an implemented non-self-executing treaty. 
 
 331. See, e.g., supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (explaining that one 
consequence of state failure to comply with the Treaty of Peace was that states could not 
benefit from economically valuable forts remaining in British possession). 
 332. See supra notes 35–36, 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra notes 50–65 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 160–69 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. ratification of the 
New York Convention); supra notes 235–48 and accompanying text (explaining the Fifth 
Circuit’s position that the New York Convention is distinct from its implementing 
legislation); see also supra notes 61–62, 64–65, 89–92, 150–51 and accompanying text 
(supporting a view of the Article II treaty process as a foreign relations law making process 
of the national government). 
 336. The FAA does not alter the essentials of the New York Convention. Compare supra 
Part II.A.1.b, with supra Part II.A.1.c.  The MFA is specific in that it applies to Acts of 
Congress, and an intent to remove inadvertent obstacles stemming from Congress’s 
(Commerce Clause) power is sufficiently distinct from an intent to remove obstacles 
stemming from the President’s (foreign relations) power to weigh against concluding the 
MFA applies to a treaty. See supra notes 206–09, 214 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra note 165–69 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra notes 127–35 and accompanying text. 
 339. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968); see supra note 62. 
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B.  The Second Circuit Decision and Fifth Circuit Dissent Incorrectly 
Analyze Foster Self-Execution Doctrine 
Both the Second Circuit in Stephens and the Fifth Circuit dissent in 
Safety National held the view that non-self-executing treaties have no 
independent Supremacy Clause status.340  This understanding is incorrect 
for two reasons.  First, it is at odds with the purpose underlying the Foster 
self-execution doctrine, which is to address separation of power 
concerns.341  Second, it undermines the Court sanctioned deference shown 
to foreign relations policy decisions342 and the balanced power structure 
created by the Constitution.343 
As the Fifth Circuit majority opinion in Safety National pointed out, 
Medellin and the other Supreme Court treaty execution cases dealt with 
treaties that did not have implementing legislation.344  In these cases the 
Court was not focused on an inquiry into the status of implemented non-
self-executing treaties.345  Instead, the Court was concerned with the 
violation of separation of powers by engaging in judicial lawmaking.346  
Thus, the analysis of the Court’s treaty execution decisions focuses on the 
self-executing versus non-self-executing distinction to safeguard the power 
balance set up by the Constitution.347  The Court noted this in Medellin, 
stating that “[t]he point of a non-self-executing treaty is that it ‘addresses 
itself to the political, not the judicial department.’”348  If the treaty is non-
self-executing, then because there is no legislation, the Court would violate 
separation of powers principles by directly enforcing the treaty.349  If, on 
the other hand, the treaty is self-executing, then the Court need not be 
concerned that it is stepping into the role reserved to the foreign relations 
policymakers.350 
The second problem with the Second Circuit decision in Stephens and the 
Fifth Circuit dissent’s position in Safety National is that finding that an 
implemented treaty cannot have Supremacy Clause effect violates the 
Supremacy Clause and undermines constitutional national foreign policy 
 
 340. See supra Parts II.B.2 and II.C. 
 341. See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 342. See supra notes 43, 45–49, 54–65 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra 
notes 75–76; supra text accompanying note 92. 
 343. See supra notes 54–65, 114, 127–35, 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 257–58 and accompanying text. 
 345. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 346. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 347. For example, Foster v. Nielson is an example of intent-based non-self-execution, in 
which the policy makers determine that legislation should be enacted prior to judicial 
enforcement, and therefore enforcing the treaty without legislation would violate separation 
of powers. See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.  Likewise, Medellin can be seen 
as representing separation of power concerns, similar to those in Foster, complicated by 
aspirational treaties. See supra notes 127–32, 141–57 and accompanying text. 
 348. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 516 (2008) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)); see supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 350. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 113–14. 
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decisions.351  This violates the separation of powers balance created by the 
Constitution,352 and which the Court has attempted to safeguard through its 
treaty execution distinction.353 
The Safety National dissent essentially argues that only legislation has 
preemptive force, likening a non-self-executing treaty to a model code.354  
However, the dissent acknowledges that the treaty also represents the 
binding international obligation entered into by federal actors charged with 
foreign relations policy.355  The purpose of including treaties in the 
Supremacy Clause was to ensure that foreign relation policy decisions 
would be enforced.356  Given this, the treaty is not simply an inert source of 
content.357  If the treaty is non-self-executing, the only thing left is for the 
policymakers to decide how to fulfill their obligations (i.e., how to 
implement the national foreign policy).358  Once implemented by 
legislation, the treaty, along with the legislation, is the manifestation of a 
national foreign policy decision in action, and it is logical that the 
obligations incurred by that decision could be directly enforceable under the 
treaty (if necessary) to carry out national foreign policy.359 
C.  Focusing on National Foreign Policy in Determining When Treaties 
Have Supremacy Clause Effect 
Given the purpose of the Supremacy Clause360 and the reason that the 
Foster distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties 
exists,361 Medellin is best interpreted as supporting the following 
conclusion.  Non-self-executing treaty stipulations can only be carried out 
 
 351. The foreign policy is constitutional because a valid Article II treaty was ratified by 
the President with advice and consent of the Senate, see supra notes 67–68, and the 
government was structured in a way to give the federal government power to make foreign 
policy for the nation, see supra notes 50–65 and accompanying text. 
 352. The result is that the court is engaging in a form of policymaking outside its role 
because it is analogous to law making, cf. supra note 151 and accompanying text, and 
because it involves national foreign policy, see supra notes 57–65 and accompanying text, 
which is arguably exclusive to the Executive and Legislative branches (or at least their 
decisions are entitled to the greatest weight in this field), see, e.g., supra notes 53–55 and 
accompanying text. 
 353. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra text accompanying note 279. 
 355. See supra note 279.  It is a mistake to associate the point that a treaty represents an 
international obligation with the inclusion of Treaties in the Supremacy Clause.  Regardless 
of the Supremacy Clause the whole of a nation (by international law—which is also a part of 
our law) is bound by a treaty. See, e.g., supra note 144.  In fact, to point out the international 
obligation is to acknowledge the national foreign policy decision. 
 356. See supra notes 31–42, 46, 49 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 47–48 and 
accompanying text. 
 357. Cf. supra notes 89, 245–47 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 359. In this sense treaties have dormant Supremacy Clause power.  The treaty requires 
implementing legislation to achieve Supremacy Clause effect and principles underlying 
dormant foreign affairs preemption call for preemptive force of some implemented non-self-
executing treaties. 
 360. See supra notes 35–49 and accompanying text. 
 361. See supra notes 344–50 and accompanying text. 
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judicially (or have Supremacy Clause effect which binds judges) once there 
is legislation authorizing the treaty’s implementation.362  Then, after 
implementing legislation is passed, treaty stipulations should be carried out, 
as a matter of enforcing national foreign relations policy decisions, in 
accordance with the legislation and the implemented treaty.363  Important 
requirements include that the treaty is not one whose result can only be 
achieved through an Act of Congress,364 that foreign policymakers did not 
indicate that the treaty should not have Supremacy Clause effect after 
implementation (e.g., explicitly specify that the treaty never be directly 
enforceable even after implemented),365 and that the implementing 
legislation does not modify (e.g., differ substantively from the treaty) or 
constrict the treaty (e.g., explicitly specify that the legislation alone governs 
the subject matter).366  If none of these factors are present then the treaty 
obligations ought to be regarded as enforceable law (with full Supremacy 
Clause effect) as necessary and reasonable to enforce the national foreign 
policy decisions made by the federal government as against conflicting state 
actions.367  This ensures the benefits of those decisions to the entire nation. 
To use the distinction in a way that allows state interests to reverse preempt 
the foreign policy decision (absent congressional intent to do so) subverts 
the power structure created by the Constitution and is an improper 
nullification of the Supremacy Clause.368 
Thus, in the case of an implemented non-self-executing treaty, courts 
should focus first on whether the reason the treaty was non-self-executing 
bars direct enforcement, as in the case of the intent of the treaty makers or 
the unconstitutional without legislation categories.369  If it is not a bar, then 
the focus should shift to the national foreign policy decision contained in 
the treaty and the impact the implementing legislation may have had, if any, 
on that national policy decision.  If the legislation does not alter or constrict 
the treaty, then the treaty certainly maintains its Supremacy Clause effect 
independent of the fate of its implementing legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by the actions of the State of Texas in Medellin, the 
concern that states will act in ways to violate the United States’ obligations 
and interfere with national foreign policy and international relations is as 
real today as it was at the time of the founding.  The detriment to the nation 
as a whole and to other states tend to outweigh the benefits any one state 
 
 362. See supra Part I.C.1.a–b. 
 363. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 364. See, e.g., supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text (discussing obligations that 
constitutionally require legislation as the vehicle for executing the obligation). 
 365. This inquiry is similar to the intent based theory of non-self-executing treaties, and 
can be considered a part of the foreign policy decision. See, e.g., supra notes 118–24 and 
accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 31–42, 46 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra notes 151–53, 352 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra notes 364–65 and accompanying text. 
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may receive from ignoring national policy.  Although in Medellin no 
judicial solution to this problem was possible because the treaties in 
question were not self-executing and had not been implemented, this is not 
the case when the treaty has been implemented.  In such a situation, as this 
Note argues, courts can in some instances uphold Treaties as the “supreme 
Law of the Land” and they should do so in order to achieve state 
compliance with U.S. foreign policy as intended by the Constitution. 
 
